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Abstract 
In 1994 Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which in 
part gave the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJCRD) the power to 
investigate local law enforcement agencies for Constitutional and civil rights violations. 
Researchers have found these investigations are expensive, time consuming, and highly 
intrusive to a law enforcement agency. To understand how these investigations are 
impacting communities, data were gathered on cities with local law enforcement agencies 
that have experienced an investigation by the DOJCRD. Using a quasi-experimental, 
multiple time-series research design with a paired samples t-test, the dependent variables 
(violent crime and arrest rates) were analyzed for any differences before and after the 
introduction of the independent variable (the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation). With an established a = .05, adjusting for non-reported crime, and 
comparing to a non-equivalent control variable (national crime rate), the research 
findings indicate increased violent crime with the commencement of these investigations. 
The results also show that arrest rates significantly decreased indicating the possibility of 
de-policing. The negative impact to communities with increased violent crime rates and 
decreased arrest rates calls into question the efficacy of DOJCRD investigations. By 
supporting the recommendation for Congress to repeal this power given to the DOJCRD, 
this research can lead to positive social change by preventing federal government 
intrusion into local government that is negatively impacting communities.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Control and Law Enforcement Act 
(VCCLEA), which in part granted the Department of Justice the authority to investigate 
local law enforcement agencies for patterns and practice of Constitutional and civil rights 
violations. This enabled the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJCRD) to 
examine all facets of a local law enforcement agency to determine if there were systemic, 
rather than isolated incidents of officers violating the Constitutional rights or civil rights 
of the citizens they serve. This type of investigation is highly intrusive to a law 
enforcement agency and can last months, and in some cases years. If the DOJCRD 
investigation determines there are patterns and practices of Constitutional or civil rights 
violations by a local law enforcement agency, they have the power to seek court 
enforceable mandates against them. Mandates can create a monetary burden on an agency 
and subject it to years of further oversight by the court. Although at first this seems like a 
way to provide oversight of local law enforcement agencies to prevent aggressive or 
rogue policing, there is evidence that this Congressional act is harming some 
communities. 
 Analyses of a small sample of agencies that have undergone scrutiny by the 
DOJCRD has indicated negative outcomes. Preliminary findings indicated soaring violent 
crime rates and dramatically reduced arrest rates in the wake of these investigations. In 
some cases, communities are under siege with the commencement of DOJCRD 
investigations. In this study, I analyzed agencies that have come under the scrutiny of the 
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DOJCRD for multiple alleged patterns and practice investigations. The positive social 
change aspects of this research can lead to safer communities and could save lives. 
 Chapter 1 provides the background of the problem and then a deeper 
understanding of the issues in the problem statement. By forming this basis, I will then 
define the purpose of the study, moving into the research questions and hypothesis. After 
some discussion of the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the study, I 
conclude the section with a look at the significance of the study and a final summary. 
Background 
The Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for 2016 indicates a 
5.3% increase in violent crime in the United States from 2015 (Department of Justice, 
2017). Some areas of the country; however, have seen greater increases. For instance, 
Ferguson, Missouri experienced a 65% increase in violent crime between 2014 and 2015. 
Chicago experienced a 58% increase in homicides between 2015 and 2016 (Peters, n.d.) 
and in Baltimore, shootings increased by 72% between 2014 and 2015 (Bidgood, 2016). 
These increases have prompted researchers to look for causation. 
 Ferguson, Chicago, and Baltimore have some similar attributes that have led 
researchers to consider correlations among the cities. For instance, all three cities endured 
an event involving local law enforcement officers that triggered civil unrest. Some have 
speculated that because these events became highly publicized in the media, officers 
might be pulling back from preventative enforcement and this is leading to increased 
violent crime. This theory, coined the Ferguson effect, has been examined by several 
researchers. Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe and Shjarback (2016) analyzed crime rates in large 
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cities throughout the country to explain the uptick in the national crime rate. They 
hypothesized the Ferguson effect was influencing all law enforcement and not just those 
in Ferguson, Missouri. Using a sample of large cities across the country, they found no 
correlation with Ferguson, Missouri or the national crime rate. Nix and Wolfe (2016) 
considered what they called the role of managerial, organizational justice as an 
influencing factor to the Ferguson effect. In their qualitative study, they analyzed 
officers’ perceptions and attitudes in the Ferguson area. They found that officers were 
willing to address community issues when they felt their agencies would support them. 
The findings opened the door for the possibility that upper command decisions within a 
law enforcement agency are causing de-policing, and responsible for the uptick in crime. 
 To date, there is only one study on the DOJCRD as an influence on violent crime 
rates. Rushin and Edwards (2017) looked at how DOJCRD adjudicated mandates were 
influencing crime rates in cities under scrutiny. They found increases in several crime 
categories with the introduction of external regulation or mandates. However, as 
mentioned earlier, investigations are lengthy and crime rates begin to increase long 
before the influencing factors of mandates. For example, Chicago is experiencing 
significant increases in violent crime rates since the onset of the DOJCRD investigation 
and mandates have yet to be adjudicated or implemented as of this writing. 
 In my review, no study has been conducted on the effects of the commencement 
of a DOJCRD investigation on local crime and arrest rates. There is not much dispute that 
crime rates are significantly rising in areas where the DOJCRD has conducted a patterns 
and practice of Constitutional or civil rights violations investigation. What did not appear 
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in the literature is how the commencement of this investigation, rather than the applied 
mandates, may be leading to substantial increases in crime and lower arrest rates in these 
communities. If a correlation exists between the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation and crime rates that are leaving some communities vulnerable, a review of 
this policy must follow. The importance of this not only affects the day-to-day suffering 
of these cities, but it could save lives. 
Problem Statement 
After years of falling violent crime rates (Department of Justice, 2016), the FBI 
has released its 2016 Preliminary Semiannual UCR, which indicates a 5.3% increase in 
violent crime in the United States from 2015 (FBI, 2017). Some areas of the country are 
experiencing greater increases in their crime rates. Ferguson, Missouri has experienced a 
65% increase in violent crime in the last 2 years (Department of Justice, 2015). Chicago 
went from 415 murders in 2014 to 478 in 2015 (Department of Justice, 2017), which 
further increased by 58% in 2016 (Peters, n.d.). In Baltimore, there were 637 shootings in 
2015, a 72% increase from 2014 (Bidgood, 2016). The common thread among these three 
cities is that violent crime has significantly increased, and the local law enforcement 
agencies are under scrutiny by the DOJCRD. 
 Acknowledging the increase in violent crime, Doyle Sam Dotson III, the Chief of 
the St. Louis Police Department, theorized that officer “pull-back” might be the cause, 
and he attributed this to what he called the “Ferguson effect” (Beyers, 2017). Under this 
theory, officers are experiencing a polarizing effect due to media sensationalism and 
subsequent manifestations surrounding encounters with African Americans. To test this 
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theory, Wolf and Nix (2016) surveyed officers around Ferguson, Missouri. They 
concluded that officers who have confidence in their authority or perceive their agency as 
fair are more willing to partner with the community to solve problems, regardless of the 
potential effects derived from negative publicity. Their findings unveil the possibility that 
something other than officer fears may be responsible. If officers are “pulling back,” and 
this is causing crime rates to increase, it could be that agency administrative decisions are 
the cause. The DOJCRD has the power to establish court enforceable mandates on law 
enforcement agencies, and this may be the impetus for administrators to direct their 
efforts and resources to other, less provocative areas. 
The objective of this research was to analyze secondary data sources for the 
before and after effects on violent crime and arrest rates of all agencies that have come 
under DOJCRD scrutiny since their inception in 1994. This is a quantitative, quasi-
experimental, time-series design, with two continuous dependent variables (violent crime 
rate and arrest rate) and one categorical independent variable measured before and after 
the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation of a law enforcement agency. The 
analysis also includes the use of a nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to analyze crime rates and arrest rates 
before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation of a local law 
enforcement agency. I sought to determine if the independent variable, the 
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, has an impact on the dependent variables 
violent crime rate and arrest rate. Preliminary analysis using data from Ferguson, 
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Baltimore, and Chicago indicated significant changes were occurring to violent crime 
rates and arrest rates, and the changes were negatively affecting the communities 
involved. 
 The importance of law enforcement working within the guidelines of the 
Constitution cannot be overstated. This research is not an attempt to endorse any position 
regarding investigations conducted by the DOJCRD or the agency under scrutiny. 
However, I recognize that a law enforcement agency’s primary purpose is to protect its 
citizens. There are indications that when the DOJCRD commence their investigations, 
crime rates increase to levels that put communities in danger. In Ferguson, Baltimore, and 
Chicago, the DOJCRD left rising violent crime rates and dramatically reduced arrest 
rates. If these three cities are representative of the whole, this calls into question the 
efficacy of DOJCRD investigations. As stated earlier, in Chicago, mandates by the 
DOJCRD have not yet been adjudicated or implemented, and the investigation alone has 
led to increased violent crime rates and reduced arrest rates. 
 I analyzed the before and after effects on the dependent variables, violent crime 
rates and arrest rates, with the introduction of the independent variable, DOJCRD 
investigations into local law enforcement agencies. Increased violent crime rates and 
decreased arrest rates were not the intention of Congress when they granted this authority 
to the DOJCRD. 
Theoretical Framework 
The National Institute of Justice (2009) has identified several theories for crime 
causation: routine activity theory, situational crime prevention theory, broken windows 
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theory, crime opportunity theory, social disorganization theory, and crime pattern theory. 
These theories establish why crime occurs in some places and not others. Of these 
theories, I considered the routine activity theory and situational crime prevention theory. 
Both routine activity theory and situational crime prevention theory include an 
element of guardianship and help posit that the mere presence of a person deters 
perpetrators of crime. The essence of this research supports the idea that internal policy 
changes have led to law enforcement officers pulling back from otherwise high crime 
areas, and this factor is contributing to increased violent crime rates. The question of 
what triggered this phenomenon is the foundation of this study. The first step in this 
process is to identify if a small sample is representative of the entire population of 
agencies that have endured an overarching, multiple allegation, patterns and practice of 
Constitutional and civil rights violations investigation by the DOJCRD. 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
violent crime rates? 
H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of 
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a 
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
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RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
arrest rates? 
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
Nature of Study 
This quantitative study involved a quasi-experimental, multiple time-series, 
nonequivalent control group design. I analyzed violent crime rates and arrest rates before 
and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into local law enforcement 
agencies. I analyzed changes to the dependent variables, violent crime rate and arrest rate, 
after the introduction of the independent variable, the commencement of an investigation 
by the DOJCRD on a local law enforcement agency. The analysis includes the use of a 
nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate, during the same time periods that 
each city has come under scrutiny of the DOJCRD. Multiple time-series was used to 
determine violent crime rates, arrest rates, and the national crime rate before and after the 
commencement a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
Definitions 
The following are Part I crimes as defined by the FBI for UCR data and are 
characterized as violent crimes. The data for this study includes only Part I offenses. 
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Criminal homicide: Includes murder and nonnegligent manslaughter: the willful 
(nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence, 
attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides, and accidental deaths are excluded. The 
program classifies justifiable homicides separately and limits the definition to the killing 
of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty or the killing of a felon, during 
the commission of a felony, by a private citizen. Criminal homicide also refers to 
manslaughter by negligence: the killing of another person through gross negligence. 
Deaths of persons due to their own negligence, accidental deaths not resulting from gross 
negligence, and traffic fatalities are not included in the category Manslaughter by 
Negligence (FBI, 2017). 
Forcible rape/legacy rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against 
her will. Rapes by force and attempts or assaults to rape, regardless of the age of the 
victim, are included. Statutory offenses (no force used—victim under age of consent) are 
excluded (FBI, 2017). 
Revised rape: Penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any 
body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the 
consent of the victim. Attempts or assaults to commit rape are also included; however, 
statutory rape and incest are excluded. In December 2011, the UCR program changed its 
definition of SRS rape to this revised definition. This change can be seen in the UCR data 
starting in 2013. Any data reported under the older definition of rape will be called 
“legacy rape.” (FBI, 2017). 
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Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, 
custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by 
putting the victim in fear (FBI, 2017). 
Aggravated assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for inflicting 
severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use 
of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or bodily harm. Simple assaults are 
excluded (FBI, 2017). 
Assumptions 
I made the following assumptions for this research. First, I assumed the data from 
the UCR was accurate. The FBI gathers data from approximately 18,000 law enforcement 
agencies across the country. Despite rules and regulatory procedures for agencies 
reporting to the UCR, there could be differences in how they report their data. My second 
assumption was that the UCR has not made mistakes in reporting the data provided. To 
reduce the threats to internal validity I limited the data to only Part I, violent crime 
offenses. There is less ambiguity in the definitions of these crimes and agencies are more 
likely to report this data accurately. I further address this issue by using a time-series 
design and collecting data for 3 years before and after the introduction of the independent 
variable. My third assumption was the use of quantitative, time-series methodology as the 
appropriate design for this study. In this case, I used an interrupted time-series design 
with a series of observations made before and after the introduction of the independent 
variable. My fourth assumption was that the UCR accurately reports the national crime 
rate, which I used to strengthen the design by using it as a nonequivalent control variable. 
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My fifth and final assumption was that the DOJCRD reports the accurate date for the 
commencement of their investigation in their investigation findings report. 
Scope and Delimitations 
This study includes all agencies that have come under scrutiny of the DOJCRD 
for multiple allegations of patterns and practice of Constitutional and civil rights 
violations. Other inquiries made by the DOJCRD are not as invasive. For instance, in 
three cases the DOJCRD investigated how local organizations handled sexual assault 
cases. To look at only one facet of an organization is not nearly as intrusive as an 
overarching, multiple allegation, patterns, and practice investigation. This type of 
investigation is highly intrusive, time consuming, and costly to the agency involved. This 
study encompasses the entire population of agencies that fall under these criteria, thus 
improving validity and generalizability.  
Limitations 
This study includes the entire population rather than a sample. By doing this, I 
strengthen validity; however, because the study includes violent crime and arrest rates, 
there may be confounding variables. I addressed this issue by looking at a specific point 
in time and measuring before and after that point. Maxfield and Babbie (2011) argue that 
validity issues are problematic with time-series designs unless they include a long series 
of observations before and after the introduction of an independent variable. For this 
study I used the commencement date provided by the DOJCRD and included data for 3 
years before and 3 years after the introduction of the independent variable. I considered 
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the year the investigation commenced as Year 1 after the introduction of the independent 
variable.  
 I found UCR data to be mostly accurate and complete, but there were many 
instances where it was not. Rather than to decrease sample size, I contacted several 
agencies directly to gather all the data available. I found some agencies had all the data I 
needed, others had crime data but not arrest data, and in some cases they were missing all 
the data I was requesting. In some instances, I analyzed crime data on a city and not 
arrest data because it was unavailable. If both the UCR and agency were missing years I 
could not include them in the analysis. I provide a table in Chapter 4 outlining data issues 
specific to all agencies under consideration. 
Significance 
If a correlation exists between the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation 
into local law enforcement agency, increased violent crime rates, and reduced arrest rates, 
this is not likely to be the intention of Congress when they empowered the DOJCRD in 
1994. If these three communities (Ferguson, Chicago, Baltimore) are typical of the results 
when local law enforcement agencies are under scrutiny by the DOJCRD, communities 
are vulnerable to high violent crime rates. To date, there is no multiple time-series 
research into the before and after effects on violent crime rates, and arrest rates, from the 
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
This study could contribute to positive social change by unveiling a policy put in 
place that may be contributing to substantially increased violent crime rates. If a 
correlation exists between violent crime rates, arrest rates, and the DOJCRD investigating 
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a local law enforcement agency, further research and a review of current policies must 
follow. The primary responsibility of law enforcement, including the Department of 
Justice, is the protection of its citizens. If policies are in place that undermines this 
responsibility, positive social change would equate to the preservation of life. 
Summary 
Walden University’s commitment to positive social change includes the 
evaluation of current public policies and their impact on society. I hypothesized that the 
well-intentioned policy of DOJCRD investigations may be the impetus for increasing 
violent crime rates and declining arrest rates in communities. By uncovering a correlation 
between the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into local law enforcement 
agencies and an increase in violent crime rates and decline in arrest rates, this research 
can lead to improving the quality of life in these communities and could help save lives. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In response to the public outcry of perceived police brutality in 1994, Congress 
granted the DOJCRD the authority to investigate state, county, and municipal law 
enforcement agencies for patterns and practice of Constitutional or civil rights violations. 
If substantiated, the DOJCRD can obtain court-ordered mandates to effect change within 
those agencies. This policy is well-intentioned and holds law enforcement accountable to 
the public they serve. However, an analysis of a small sample of agencies that have 
withstood the lengthy and invasive nature of these investigations unveil a negative trend. 
Upon the initiation of a formal investigation by the DOJCRD, violent crime rates increase 
and arrest rates dramatically fall, leaving communities at risk. This has been somewhat 
evident in Ferguson, Missouri, Chicago, Illinois, and Baltimore, Maryland. This study 
was conducted to examine whether this small sample is representative of the entire 
population of agencies subject to scrutiny by the DOJCRD. 
Literature Search Strategy 
There is little current research on correlations between violent crime and arrest 
rates post DOJCRD investigations. Most research has been on the mandates placed on 
law enforcement agencies and the effect they have had on the organization. The focus of 
the research thus far includes changes within the agency and whether they have 
implemented the mandates agreed to in the consent decree. The bulk of the research has 
been an attempt to find causes for significant increases in certain areas of the country. 
Theories such as the Ferguson effect and de-policing are at the forefront of the research. 
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Although there is evidence to support these theories, there is no research that has 
considered the effect of DOJCRD investigations on crime rates and arrest rates. 
I used Walden University’s library database as well as criminal justice and 
psychological search engines. I used ProQuest, EBSCO, and SAGE Journals but also 
LexisNexis from both Walden University and University of California, Irvine. I found 
Google Scholar helpful in some instances when I was searching for general ideas or 
trying to find news articles not related to research. I used Cornell Law when I needed 
specific definitions on law questions.  
The bulk of my references are within the last 5 years. References beyond 5years 
were necessary in many cases to provide historical information on important points, 
policy, and law formation. Key search terms included Department of Justice, federal 
oversight of law enforcement, 42 U.S.C §14141, consent decrees, federal mandates of 
law enforcement agencies, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Judiciary 
Committee, LAPD, Ferguson Effect, de-policing. 
History of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
In 1991, a subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on 
the Judiciary called a hearing to discuss the issue of police brutality. This was in response 
to the public outcry stemming from the videotaped beating of Rodney King by Los 
Angeles Police Department officers, publicized in the national media. The Federal 
Government having statutory jurisdiction under Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241, Conspiracy 
Against Rights, and Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of 
Law, wanted to examine how widespread police misconduct is, not just in Los Angeles, 
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but nationwide (FBI, n.d.; House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, 1991). The emphasis of the committee was to examine how 
effective the Federal Government’s response is to police misconduct and to assess the 
need for strengthening federal laws to address recalcitrant law enforcement agencies. At 
that time, the Department of Justice and private citizens could do little to effect change in 
a law enforcement agency because they did not possess the required statutory authority. 
Congress rejected granting this authority in 1957, 1959, and again in 1964 with the 
acclaimed Civil Rights Act. Congress considered this authority an inappropriate power 
for the Department of Justice (House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, 1991). Two separate cases, the United States v. the City of 
Philadelphia and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, were to test this lack of authority.  
In the United States v. City of Philadelphia, 187 F.2d, (1980), the U.S. 
government alleged that the city of Philadelphia and its police department engaged in a 
patterns or practices of depriving persons of rights protected by the due process clause of 
the 14th amendment. The District Court dismissed the suit, finding that the attorney 
general had no authority to bring a lawsuit to advance the civil rights of a third person. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reviewed the case and agreed with the findings 
of the District Court (The United States v. City of Philadelphia, 187 F.2d, 1980). This 
decision would summarily remove any possibility of federal government intervention in a 
law enforcement agency while lacking statutory authority. 
In the City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 461 U.S. 95 (1983) case, Adolph Lyons 
sought damages against officers from the LAPD for injuries sustained from the use of a 
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chokehold. Lyons alleged that the officers applied the chokehold despite Lyons offering 
no resistance to an illegal arrest. The chokehold rendered Lyons unconscious and 
damaged his larynx. Lyons also sought an injunction against the city of Los Angeles 
barring any future use of chokeholds. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California ultimately entered a preliminary injunction against the use of chokeholds 
except in circumstances where there was a threat of death or serious bodily injury. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision 
of the lower court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately disagreed 
with the lower courts. They found federal courts on behalf of private citizens were 
without jurisdiction to entertain claims for injunctive relief. Although Lyons may have a 
claim for damages based on injury, absent a real and immediate threat of officers 
targeting him in the future, injunctive relief was not possible (City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 1983). 
Based on the testimony before the House Subcommittee on police brutality, the 
Judiciary Committee created the Police Accountability Act of 1991, granting authority to 
the Department of Justice to pursue patterns and practice cases against recalcitrant law 
enforcement agencies. Congress again voted against giving the Department of Justice this 
power. However, in 1994 Congress enacted the VCCLEA and the only part of the Police 
Accountability Act of 1991 not included in the VCCLEA was a private citizen’s right to 
pursue injunctive relief for police malfeasance.  
Title XXI of the VCCLEA, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (Section 14141; re-codified at 34 
U.S.C. § 12601) authorized the U.S. attorney general to investigate and litigate cases 
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involving law enforcement agencies for patterns or practices of Constitutional or civil 
rights violations (Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). Under this 
provision, the DOJCRD could obtain court-ordered mandates in the form of consent 
decrees on state and local law enforcement agencies to address institutional pattern and 
practice failures causing systemic police misconduct. Isolated instances are not enough to 
establish a pattern or practice of institutional failures; investigation findings must unveil 
systemic violations of peoples’ rights. Typically, investigations include the use of 
excessive force; unlawful stops, searches, or arrests; and discriminatory policing. Other 
considerations include bias based on race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, and sexual 
orientation. The DOJCRD established the Special Litigation Section in 1995 to enforce 
the police misconduct provision of the VCCLEA. 
Investigations Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
The first case brought under U.S.C. § 14141 was in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania in 
1997. Since then, the DOJCRD has opened 69 formal investigations that led to 40 court 
ordered, mandated reform agreements or consent decrees (Civil Rights Division U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2017). Decisions to initiate an investigation into a law 
enforcement agency begin with preliminary inquiries stemming from complaints made by 
community members, advocacy groups, attorneys, judges, legislators, police officers, 
other law enforcement agencies, or local government officials. Although preliminary 
inquiries are confidential, they are extensive and can involve research into nearly any 
aspect of a law enforcement agency. Pending the results of the preliminary inquiry, the 
DOJCRD can decide to take no further action or consider other forms of intervention 
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such as providing guidance to effective community policing operations. If the inquiry 
points toward a more significant problem, the DOJCRD director can decide to allocate 
the resources toward a formal investigation of the agency. The decision to pursue an 
official investigation includes the high cost associated with the project. In 2000 the 
Department of Justice requested an additional $100 million in funding to increase the 
number of investigations allowed (Budget Staff Justice Management Division, 1999). 
Rushin (2014) estimated the Department of Justice averaged three investigations per year 
since the inception of U.S.C. § 14141. If the director decides to move forward with the 
investigation, the DOJCRD notifies the jurisdiction’s chief executive officer and chief 
legal officer in advance of a public announcement. 
Formal investigations of law enforcement agencies are extensive and highly 
intrusive to the organization under investigation. Investigators review hundreds and 
sometimes thousands of pages of internal documents, reports, officer training, and 
personnel files (Rushin, 2014). Although the length of investigations varies, many will 
take over a year to complete. For instance, the investigation into the Chicago Police 
Department began on December 7, 2015 and concluded January 13, 2017 (United States 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division & United States Attorney’s Office, 2017).  
From the perspective of the DOJCRD, police leaders set the tone for the law 
enforcement agency’s approach to an investigation, particularly in the early stages (Civil 
Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). Because of this, they begin by 
gathering perspectives from rank and file officers and interact with representatives of 
police labor organizations and affinity groups such as the Black, Latino, female, and 
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LGBTQ officer associations. They explain the purpose and general structure of the 
planned investigation and answer questions that arise. There is no established timetable to 
completion, and there is no set agenda as to what they will review next. These 
investigations are costly and disruptive, and are likely to have a profound effect on any 
agency, especially a small organization like the Ferguson Police Department. 
The investigation of the Ferguson Police Department began September of 2014 
and concluded March 4, 2015. According to the investigation findings, investigators 
interviewed all top-ranking officials from the City of Ferguson, municipal court judges 
and clerks, and half of the sworn officers from the Ferguson Police Department. They 
participated in ride-a-longs with officers, reviewed over 35,000 pages of police records, 
and thousands of emails and other electronic materials. Using statistical experts, they 
analyzed officer stops, searches, citations, arrests, and data collected by the municipal 
court. They met with 10 neighborhood associations, community groups, and advocacy 
organizations and conducted both in-person and telephone interviews from people that 
reside in Ferguson or who had interactions with the Ferguson Police Department (United 
States Department of Justice Civil Right Division, Investigation of Ferguson Police 
Department, 2015). This did not include any preliminary work they completed or the on-
going monitoring resulting from the investigation.  
Upon completion of an investigation, the DOJCRD notifies the agency of the 
findings and whether they have found sufficient evidence to support a finding of a pattern 
or practice of conduct in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Of the 69 
investigations conducted by the DOJCRD since the enactment of U.S.C. § 14141, 26 
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resulted in no further action required. The others resulted in recommendations for some 
form of intervention, up to and including court mandated consent decrees (Civil Rights 
Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). 
Consent Decrees Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
Consent decrees are an order of a court based on an agreement made between 
parties in a lawsuit. They are subject to approval by the court and cannot be appealed 
except in instances of fraud (Legal Information Institute, n.d.). Consent decrees are 
preferable in most cases to avoid the publicity and potential damaging exposure from a 
lengthy court trial. Some critics of consent decrees argue that federal courts assert too 
much power on defendants and contend they impose conditions on local and state 
government that usurp state power (Farlex, n.d.). Typically, the DOJCRD petitions the 
federal court to order the department to end the misconduct and change policies and 
procedures that have contributed to the misconduct. From these petitions, negotiations 
commence between the DOJCRD and the law enforcement agency that lead to consent 
decrees, which place mandates on agencies to effect change. The federal court then 
reviews the consent decree, and if accepted, will order the terms of the consent decree. In 
most cases, law enforcement agencies have a time frame to complete the changes, and 
some form of monitoring is ordered that will update the court on the agencies progress. 
Consent decrees can vary in length but will typically be in place for 5 years or longer 
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 748). Consent decrees affect many aspects and operations 
of a law enforcement agency as evidenced in the City of Ferguson mandated decree.  
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The consent decree for the City of Ferguson addresses community policing and 
engagement, reform of the municipal code, policies and training, bias-free police and 
court practices, voluntary contacts, stops, searches, citations, and arrest assessment and 
improvement, first amendment protected activity assessment and improvement, crisis 
intervention, school resource officer program, body-worn and in-car camera program, 
supervision assessment and improvement, officer assistance and support assessment and 
improvement, recruitment assessment and improvement, performance evaluations and 
promotions assessment and improvement, supplemental recruit and in-service training 
programs, municipal court reform, accountability assessment and improvement, civilian 
oversight, data collection, reporting and transparency, monitoring, compliance 
assessment and enforcement of the consent decree. The decree affects nearly every 
operation of the Ferguson Police Department and will not terminate until the city has 
been in full and active compliance for 2 years. Remarkably, crime rates, arrest rates and 
public safety are not a consideration of the investigation or mandated consent decree 
(United States of America v. The City of Ferguson, 2016). 
Correlation with Violent Crime Rates 
Investigations of police agencies by the DOJCRD and subsequent consent 
decrees, if mandated, are intrusive and disruptive to the normal operations of a police 
agency. This may be having a significant impact on violent crime rates in those 
communities. After decades of falling violent crime rates (Department of Justice, 2016), 
FBI statistics indicate the violent crime rate increased by 3.4% nationwide in 2016 when 
compared to 2015, the most significant single-year increase in 25 years. The nationwide 
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homicide rate increased by 7.9%, for a total increase of more than 20% since 2014 (FBI, 
2017). Some areas of the country are experiencing even greater increases in their crime 
rates. Ferguson, Missouri has experienced a 65% increase in violent crime in the last 2 
years (Department of Justice, 2015). Chicago went from 415 murders in 2014 to 478 in 
2015 (Department of Justice, 2017) and further increased by 58% in 2016 (Peters, n.d.). 
In Baltimore, there were 637 shootings in 2015, a 72% increase from 2014 (Bidgood, 
2016). The common thread among these three cities is that violent crime has significantly 
increased, and the local law enforcement agency is under scrutiny by the DOJCRD 
(United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015, 2016; United States 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division & United States Attorney’s Office, 2017). 
The DOJCRD investigation of Ferguson Police Department began in September 
2014 and culminated with a consent decree filed in March of 2016. In 2014 the violent 
crime rate in Ferguson per 100,000 inhabitants was 291.6 and increased to 505.7 in 2015 
(Department of Justice, 2015). In May 2015, the DOJCRD opened its investigation into 
Baltimore Police Department, which culminated in a consent decree filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maryland on January 12, 2017 (United States of America 
v. Police Department of Baltimore, 2017; Department of Justice, n.d.). During this time, 
shootings in Baltimore increased by 72% (Bidgood, 2016).  
At of the time of this writing, the DOJCRD has not adjudicated mandates on the 
Chicago Police Department despite the investigation’s review of the department. This is 
an important point toward this study because the findings of the investigation conducted 
by the DOJCRD found officer morale “profoundly” low (United States Department of 
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Justice Civil Rights Division & United States Attorney’s Office, 2017). The investigation 
commenced in December of 2015, and in 2016 there were 762 homicides, nearly 300 
more than 2015. There were also 1,100 more shootings in 2016 compared to 2015 
(Department of Justice, 2017). The findings of the investigation did not consider any 
correlation between the onset of the investigation and the significant increase in violent 
crime. They instead looked to the Chicago Police Department to address the mistrust the 
community has in them to affect the soaring violent crime rates (United States 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, & United States Attorney’s Office Northern 
District of Illinois, 2017). This may be true in Chicago, but the phenomenon is clearly 
prevalent in more than just one city. 
In 2016 the Department of Justice, responding to rising violent crime rates, 
commissioned Dr. Richard Rosenfeld, Professor at the University of Missouri, to 
examine the increase in homicides from 2015. Rosenfeld (2016) considered the emerging 
theories of the Ferguson effect, de-policing, and increased heroin usage as causative 
factors. He concluded increased heroin usage as the primary cause for the phenomenon, 
while deemphasizing the impact of the Ferguson effect and de-policing. There was no 
consideration given to the DOJCRD investigations, and of greater importance, Rosenfeld 
concluded that if the Ferguson effect or de-policing is the cause for the uptick in 
homicides, then we should also observe significant reductions in arrests (Rosenfeld, 
2016). Uptick in crime and significant reductions in arrests are precisely what is 
happening in Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago. 
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Ferguson Effect 
Doyle Sam Dotson III, the Chief of the St. Louis Police Department, theorized 
that officer “pull-back” might be the cause of the increase in crime rates and attributed 
this to what he coined the “Ferguson effect” (Beyers, 2017). Under this theory, officers 
are experiencing a polarizing effect due to media sensationalism and subsequent 
manifestations surrounding encounters with African Americans. The impetus for this was 
when Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson shot and killed an unarmed African 
American wanted for robbery named Michael Brown. During the arrest, Brown began 
beating on the officer and attempted to take his gun. Upon reviewing the case, a Grand 
Jury declined to indict Officer Wilson, and this led to civil discourse and rioting in the 
predominantly African American community. Officer Wilson wanted to return to the 
Ferguson police department, and despite his vindication in the shooting, the department 
and the city considered him too great of a liability and forced him to resign. Due to 
continual harassment by the media and death threats made to his family, very few people 
know where he lives with his wife and daughter (Yan, 2015). The finding of justified use 
of force in this case forever altered the lives of the officer and his family. 
Baltimore also had an officer-involved incident that led to civil discourse in a 
predominantly African American community. In 2015, six officers were subject to arrest 
when a 25-year-old African American named Freddie Gray died while in police custody. 
Charges on the officers ranged from second degree depraved-heart murder to illegal 
arrest. All the officers pled not-guilty, and four of them went to trial. One trial ended in a 
mistrial, and three others were found not guilty. Prosecutors fearing the same resolve on 
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the remaining cases dismissed all the charges on the remaining officers. Marilyn Mosby, 
States Attorney for Baltimore, faced considerable criticism for pursuing charges that 
many considered baseless. Several officers involved have filed civil litigation against 
Mosby for malicious prosecution. This encounter severely affected the lives of these 
officers and their families for a considerable amount of time and has continued well into 
2017. 
Officers, fearing these types of scenarios, are what some theorize is leading to 
officer pull-back from proactive policing, or what is coined the Ferguson effect. 
However, Wolfe and Nix (2016) studied the Ferguson effect phenomenon by 
interviewing officers from around the Ferguson, Missouri area. Officers reported that 
regardless of any effects they may endure from negative publicity, if they felt their 
agency was fair, and they had confidence in their authority, they were willing to work 
with communities to solve problems. This signals something other than officers’ fears 
being attributable to the Ferguson effect and increased violent crime rates.  
Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe and Shjarback (2016) looked at correlations between the 
Ferguson effect and pre-and post-crime rates in “large” cities throughout the country. 
Researchers hypothesized the so-called Ferguson effect did have a chilling effect on law 
enforcement officers, and this led to crime rate increases in large cities throughout the 
country. Researchers were unable to substantiate the hypothesis finding no correlation 
between crime rates and the so-called Ferguson effect. This study focused on large cities 
throughout the country and did not look specifically at cities with local law enforcement 
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agencies under DOJCRD investigation. Again, signaling something other than the so-
called Ferguson effect could be responsible for the increase in violent crime rates.  
De-policing 
De-policing is a theory that posits officers are deliberately ignoring crimes and 
withdrawing from crime prevention services due to fear of accusations of racial profiling. 
Rushin and Edwards (2017) considered de-policing in their study of agencies subject to 
consent decrees under U.S.C. § 14141. Using a difference-in-differences estimation 
strategy they analyzed the crime rates of 61 cities the DOJ has investigated since 1994 
and compared them to the 31 agencies that ultimately came under a consent decree. The 
focus of this study analyzed the effect of the consent decree on crime rates. They found 
statistically insignificant increases in all index crimes with the introduction of public 
scrutiny on local law enforcement agencies and statistically significant increases in 
several crime categories with the introduction of external regulation from a consent 
decree. Although they are testing for the effect on crime rates, their treatment and control 
groups came from the same population of agencies that were subject to DOJCRD 
investigation (Rushin and Edwards, 2017 p. 721). 
The timing and effect on violent crime rates in Baltimore, Ferguson, and Chicago 
when compared to the national crime rate suggest a substantial increase in violent crime 
with the onset of a DOJCRD investigation. This surge in violent crime cannot be entirely 
attributable to the consent decree as argued in Rushin and Edwards (2017) because as of 
now, Chicago is not under a consent decree and crime rates are soaring. Crime rates also 
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began to increase in Baltimore and Ferguson long before the implementation of their 
consent decrees. 
This same theory holds true when applied to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, the first 
investigation completed by the DOJCRD. The investigation commenced in April of 1996, 
concluded in January 1997 and the city entered a consent decree with the DOJCRD in 
April 1997. The violent crime rate went from 427.32 in 1995 to 480.30 in 1996 (The 
Disaster Center, 2016). Again, violent crime rates began to increase at the 
commencement of the investigation, long before external regulation from a consent 
decree. 
If de-policing is the cause it would manifest itself in other ways besides crime rate 
increases. Cantora, Lyer, and Restivo (2016) using a qualitative designed study, 
examined crime in East Baltimore and concluded that people lacked collective efficacy to 
address several issues in their communities. Specific to law enforcement they found the 
slow and ineffective response to calls for service leading citizens to believe they [law 
enforcement] didn’t care. This again signals the possibility of de-policing resulting in an 
increase in violent crime rates. If officers are not proactively working, commanders 
should recognize this and adjust, unless executive policy changes are the cause of the 
pull-back. CompStat and the Chicago Police Department may unveil this possibility. 
CompStat and the Chicago Police Department 
As police resources become scarcer, the need to effectively place valuable 
resources toward problematic areas has become critical. In 1994, New York Police 
Department adopted a program called CompStat (Bronstein, 2014). Willis (2011) found 
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the use of CompStat and community policing as the two most visible reforms of law 
enforcement to occur in the last quarter century. This strategic control system gathers and 
disseminates information on crime problems within communities and provides tracking 
information to commanders of efforts made to address the issues. The intention behind 
adopting this program is to develop a method for allocating police resources efficiently. 
This data-driven system maps crime statistics, analyzes the data, and provides real-time 
information to agency decision makers on where best to place law enforcement resources. 
Commanders are responsible for the implementation of resources and other programs to 
address crime in their areas and are required to meet regularly with colleagues and 
superiors to defend their command decisions. Commanders that fail to address crime in 
their areas are subject to discipline, up to and including demotion (Bronstein, 2014; 
Bratton, Malinowski, 2008; Moore, 2003; Moore, Braga, 2003; Weisburd, Mastrofski, 
McNally, Greenspan, and Willis, 2003).  
Numerous agencies across the country are using CompStat or some other similar 
quantifiable system to make informed decisions about resource allocation. Chicago 
Police Department was using the CompStat system but discontinued its use at 
approximately the same time as the DOJCRD investigation. Garry McCarthy, the former 
police superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, who was fired by the Mayor of 
Chicago in December of 2016, told the Daily News that among the reasons for the spike 
in violent crime in Chicago was the department no longer holds CompStat meetings to 
focus on crime hot spots, and police stops are down nearly 90% from 2015 (Blau, 2016). 
This again signals something other than officer fears attributing to the increase in crime 
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rates. This opens the door for the possibility of upper-level managers and administrators 
setting policy to address the DOJCRD accusations, instead of attending to crime rates and 
the effect on the public they serve. Missouri had similar results for police stops with 
100,000 fewer stops between 2014 and 2015 the time when Ferguson Police Department 
was under investigation by the DOJCRD (Shjarback, Decker, Wolfe & Pyrooz, 2017). 
Baltimore also experienced a reduction in arrests and a spike in crime since the inception 
of their DOJCRD investigation, (Dewan, 2017). Further evidence of de-policing and the 
theoretical possibility that DOJCRD investigations are leading to soaring crime rates. 
This calls into question the efficacy of DOJCRD investigations on local law enforcement 
agencies. 
Efficacy of the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division 
In March of 2017, Attorney General Sessions called for a review of all consent 
decrees signaling an intention to withdraw from police department investigations by the 
DOJCRD. Rushin (2014) found Department of Justice internal policy changes either 
discouraging or encouraging federal involvement in local agencies ebb and flows with the 
current administration philosophies. This finding sets the stage for inconsistent and 
selective enforcement of U.S.C. § 14141 by the top law enforcement official in the 
country who is investigating law enforcement agencies for among other things, 
inconsistent and selective enforcement of the people in their jurisdictions. 
Federal bureaucracy often comes with an exorbitant price tag. The Washington 
Post found the reform agreement in Los Angeles estimated cost at $300 million. Detroit 
projected costs at $50 million, and Puerto Rico at $200 million despite both these cities 
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being in extreme financial hardship. These figures don’t include costs associated with the 
investigations by the DOJCRD that run into the tens of hundreds of millions. In many 
cases, the salaries and expenses of the federal monitors and their staff after the 
investigations are among the most significant costs. Some even believe monitors have a 
financial incentive to prolong the oversight (Kelly, Childress, & Rich, 2015). With this 
responsibility in the hands of bureaucrats with huge budgets forcing law enforcement 
agencies to spend huge amounts of money to implement changes, the public should 
expect the outcome to be excellent. 
In 2013 the Police Executive Research Forum assessed the DOJCRD and noted 
some of the challenges of reform, prompting calls for re-examining some aspects of their 
work. Although the Forum did not state what this meant, they did acknowledge agencies 
have improved policies on critical issues such as the use of force, better training of 
officers, and more advanced information systems in the wake of DOJCRD investigations 
and subsequent consent decrees (Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). 
The LAPD investigation and subsequent consent decree provide us with a detailed 
analysis of the entire process. 
Within a month of the videotaped beating of Rodney King by LAPD officers, 
public outcry caused the Mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, to impanel the 
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, informally known as 
the Christopher Commission. The Christopher Commission examined problems with 
excessive force, racism and bias, community policing, recruitment, training, promotion, 
assignment, and other personnel issues, personnel complaints and officer discipline in the 
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LAPD. Among the many problems unveiled by the Commission were that racism and 
bias within the LAPD aggravated the problem of excessive force leading to incidents like 
the Rodney King beating (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police 
Department, 1991, p. xll). The findings prompted the LAPD to make changes to address 
the issues found by the Christopher Commission. 5 years later, LAPD convened a study 
to examine the extent to which they had addressed the recommendations of the 
Christopher Commission. The results indicated significant progress in some areas but 
lacking in other areas such as management accountability (Los Angeles Police Dept., 
1996).  
Despite the impetus for the 1991 police brutality hearings by the Subcommittee 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights being the public outcry from the LAPD Rodney King 
beatings, it would take until 1996 before the DOJCRD began a preliminary investigation 
of the LAPD. For unknown reasons the investigation didn’t progress to a conclusion until 
May of 2000 when the DOJCRD announced they had enough evidence to file a patterns 
and practice suit against the LAPD (Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2000). 
The announcement came after officer Rafael Perez unveiled illegal conduct by 
approximately 70 officers in the Rampart Division of LAPD in 1999. Allegations 
included shootings, beatings, framing and perjury by officers and led to the dismissal of 
over a hundred criminal cases and nearly 90 million dollars paid to settle civil suits 
(Stone, Foglesong, & Cole, 2009, p. 4). For three years before the unveiling of this 
scandal, the DOJCRD was investigating the LAPD. Other than acknowledging the efforts 
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of the LAPD and the Police Commission for uncovering the misconduct, the DOJCRD 
had no part in unveiling this scandal. 
In 2009, at the request of Chief William Bratton of the Los Angeles Police 
Department, Harvard Kennedy School completed a study funded by the Los Angeles 
Police Foundation, on the change that has occurred in the LAPD under a consent decree 
(Stone et al., 2009, p. 2). Researchers from Harvard Kennedy school concluded, “we see 
a staggering scale of change” and that it is unlikely that a consent decree can ever make 
improvements without strong and effective police leadership. (Stone et al., 2009, p. 68) 
Among many other assertions made in the study, they considered “de-policing” as a 
possibility given the restraints put on officers with the implementation of the consent 
decree. The study found that in every instance where the Department of Justice entered a 
consent decree with a state or local government to address an alleged patterns and 
practice of police misconduct, concerns were raised about de-policing (Stone et al., 2009, 
p. 19). Through interviews and focus groups with officers, they found many officers 
insisting that the consent decree remained an impediment to effective policing and a 
deterrent to the work necessary to reduce crime in communities (Stone et al., 2009, p.19). 
This echoed a study conducted by LAPD in 2003 showing 79% of officers believed the 
consent decree impeded their ability to reduce crime, 89% agreed that because of fear of 
being unfairly disciplined, officers are not being proactive, and 93% agreed that the threat 
of community complaints prevents them from being proactive (Stone et al., 2009, p.19). 
These findings are closely related to an LAPD study completed in 1999, before the 
implementation of a consent decree. In that study, 15% of officers felt the disciplinary 
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system was fair and 79% of officers were afraid of being punished for making an honest 
mistake. The Harvard Kennedy study concluded that distrust in the departments’ 
accountability system may have diminished during the period of the consent decree rather 
than increase. What we don’t know however, is if the distrust levels are just returning to 
normal because they are only comparing to data from the 1999 study which is 3 years 
into the DOJCRD’s investigation (Stone et al., 2009, p. 21). 
Despite officers expressing feelings of timidity and fear while engaging certain 
segments of the community, Harvard Kennedy researchers concluded; “the statistics 
refute any claim of de-policing in Los Angeles today as a result of the consent decree.” 
(Stone, Foglesong & Cole, 2009, p. 30). However, on page three of the study, the report 
states, “In the first years, when the Department was led by officials who failed to 
implement the decree, perhaps because they had resisted and resented it from the start, 
crime in Los Angeles increased” (Stone et al., 2009, p. 30). This finding was echoed in a 
Department of Justice report in 2017 (Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice, 
2017). 
The Civil Rights Division report from the Department of Justice in 2017 
acknowledges this increase in crime in Los Angeles also dismissing it because agency 
officials were not embracing the spirit of the consent decree. In the entire Department of 
Justice report of 2017, this one instance is the only time where crime rates and de-
policing are mentioned in assessing their efficacy. The report does state the Division 
typically tracks data such as the rate of stops, searches, and arrests; including the 
location, the subject’s race, ethnicity, gender, and age, but it makes no mention of 
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monitoring overall effect on crime or arrest rates in communities under investigation by 
the DOJCRD. Without reviewing all cities under DOJCRD scrutiny, we cannot conclude 
if the results in Los Angeles are an accurate representation of the outcome of DOJCRD 
investigations. 
Alpert, McLean, and Wolfe (2017) considered DOJCRD investigations and 
consent decrees and the effect they had on police accountability and reform. They found 
that when it comes to issues of evaluation and sustainability not only is there no measure 
of compliance or sustainability, but once monitors leave, there is no requirement to 
maintain any features of the consent decree. They further conclude there is no convincing 
evidence of long-term improvements in agencies under consent decrees. This report 
focuses on the consent decree and how it has impacted the law enforcement agency and 
questions the sustainability of the DOJCRD mandates. There is no discussion about crime 
rates, arrest rates or the impact to the community. 
If communities are experiencing dramatic increases in their violent crime rate and 
equally dramatic decreases in arrest rates when the DOJCRD initiates their investigation, 
this is going to have a significant impact on communities. De-policing may be the cause 
for this, but we must first look at all investigations by the DOJCRD rather than just a 
small sample. If officers are no longer engaging in preventative work, this may explain 
the substantial increase in violent crime rates based on routine activity and situational 
crime prevention theory. 
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Theoretical Basis 
There are numerous theories for crime that date back to when crime was first 
documented. 18th century Europe considered crime in more individual terms, often 
blaming the power of Satan over a person as causation. Positivism theories deemed 
societal influences are leading to human behavior and similarly, biological approaches 
analyzed nutrition, diet, and physical attributes as contributory to criminal behavior. In 
the 19th century, Cesare Lombroso considered criminals as atavists, born to be criminals 
and attempted to relate certain physical characteristics such as facial features to criminal 
psychopathology (Sabbatini, 1997). Phycological theories try to explain crime as a 
sickness, from psychological abnormalities, psychopathic personalities or mental illness. 
There is certainly no evidence to suggest that any one of these theories explains crime 
causation any more than another. 
The National Institute of Justice (2009) has identified the following theories of 
crime causation: routine activity theory, situational crime prevention theory, broken 
windows theory, crime opportunity theory, social disorganization theory, and crime 
pattern theory. These theories establish why crime occurs in some areas and not others. 
Both routine activity theory and situational crime prevention theory include an element of 
guardianship and help posit that the mere presence of a person deters perpetrators of 
crime (Clarke, 1980). 
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) seminal work on routine activities theory introduced a 
model that attempted to explain why crime occurs. The key ideas of routine activities 
theory posit the commission of a crime requires not only the existence of a motivated 
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offender, but also the availability of a suitable target and the absence of a capable 
guardian. Hollis, Felson, & Welsh (2013) argue the concept of guardianship has evolved 
and been redefined to a guardian keeps eye on the potential target of crime. “Someone is 
watching and could detect untoward behaviors that deters the likely offender from 
committing a criminal act.” (Hollis, Felson & Welsh, 2013, p. 71) 
Skeptical of singular techniques for controlling situational precipitators of crime, 
Wortly (2001) argues that reducing deindividuation also contributes to crime prevention 
and emphasizes the importance of intervention methods at the point which he claims 
comes before routine activities and situational crime opportunity theories. He does 
conclude however that controlling situational precipitators of crime and reducing 
opportunities for crime should not be understood as competing prevention approaches to 
deindividuation (Wortley, 2001, p. 28). 
Clarke (2012) looks back to 1998 when he asserted that opportunity makes a thief 
and assessed transformations in crime fighting perceptions that have occurred since that 
time. His findings led to much bolder claims about the role of opportunity in crime. 
Among the claims by Clarke is, “the more opportunities for crime that exist, the more 
crime there will be” (Clarke, 2012, p. 6). 
These theories present the possibility that if de-policing is occurring and law 
enforcement officers are pulling back from otherwise high crime areas, this factor may be 
contributing to increased violent crime rates. Sir Robert Peel regarded as the father of 
modern British policing produced the nine “Principles of Law Enforcement of 1829.” 
The ninth principle states, “The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and 
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disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them”. Although 
situational crime prevention and routine activities theories include an element of 
guardianship, this doesn’t necessarily mean only police; security guards, video cameras, 
and just simply someone being home could also qualify for guardianship. The police 
however, are the most visible manifestation of power and authority in society. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Crime rates in Pittsburg, Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago increased at the same 
time the DOJCRD began their investigation. Researchers have attempted to explain this 
phenomenon with various theories such as the Ferguson effect, de-policing, and increased 
heroin usage. Rushin and Edwards (2017) found statistically significant results in 
increased crime rates when the DOJCRD consent decrees went into effect. However, in a 
small sample of three cities, (Pittsburg, Ferguson, and Baltimore) consent decrees were 
not adjudicated for at least a year after the DOJCRD investigation began yet crime rates 
increased, and arrest rates fell well before then. In Chicago, despite the DOJCRD’s 
scathing review of the Chicago Police Department, no consent decree is in place, and yet 
the crime rate is soaring, and officer productivity is falling. 
For the communities of Pittsburg, Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago, they have 
endured increased violent crime from the time the DOJCRD announced they were going 
to investigate their local police department. This might be coincidence and justifies why 
it is necessary to examine the violent crime and arrest rates of all cities the DOJCRD has 
investigated. First and foremost, local law enforcement and the Department of Justice has 
a duty to protect communities and assist in making them safe. No study has considered 
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what happens to violent crime and arrest rates when the DOJCRD begin their 
investigation, but there are indicators that sound the alarm of concern. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The goal of this study was to analyze data from agencies that have come under 
scrutiny by the DOJCRD and any effect this had on their violent crime rates and arrest 
rates. The hypothesis considers the commencement of an investigation conducted by the 
DOJCRD into a local law enforcement agency as the impetus for increasing violent crime 
rates and falling arrest rates. 
In this section I begin by restating the research questions and hypothesis. I then 
provide the research design and rationale I used to answer the research questions. My 
methodology section will follow where I will define the population and data that were 
analyzed. I will then provide the statistical analysis I used with SPSS and the assumptions 
for proper analysis. I conclude with a discussion of the threats to validity and summary of 
the research method. 
Research Question’s and Hypothesis 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
violent crime rates? 
H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of 
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a 
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
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RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
arrest rates? 
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
Research Design and Rationale 
For the study I used a quantitative, quasi-experimental, multiple time-series 
research design. This design was selected because it allowed me to study a phenomenon 
that cannot be controlled or is unethical to be controlled (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). 
Quasi-experimental designs are distinguished from experimental designs primarily 
because they lack random assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups 
(Babbie, 2017). This research involved all agencies that have come under the scrutiny of 
the DOJCRD, so random assignment was not needed. This study also included the 
national crime rate as a nonequivalent control group. I chose this type of control group 
because the national crime rate differs significantly from the experimental groups (i.e., 
local violent crime rate and local arrest rate; Babbie, 2017). Using existing data, I 
analyzed violent crime rates and arrest rates as the dependent variables and any 
correlation they had with the independent variable, the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation. I analyzed the nonequivalent control variable, national crime rate, during 
the same time frame that each agency came under the scrutiny of the DOJCRD. The time 
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series includes 3 years before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation 
as identified in the investigation findings. 
Methodology 
Population 
The population for this study includes all agencies that have come under 
DOJCRD scrutiny for multiple alleged patterns and practice of Constitutional or civil 
rights violations. Because the entire population is well defined and manageable in size, I 
was able to use the entire population, which will go toward generalizability and eliminate 
sampling bias threats. 
The DOJCRD posited that the number of investigations they have completed 
since their inception in 1994 is 69. However, not all DOJCRD investigations are as 
intrusive to an agency. For instance, the DOJCRD investigated the Missoula Police 
Department, the University of Montana Police Department, and the Missoula County 
Attorney’s Office for failing to properly investigate and prosecute sexual assault cases. 
These investigations are not nearly as intrusive as an overarching investigation that looks 
at all facets of a law enforcement agency. There is a difference between the number the 
DOJCRD posits as investigations they have completed and those included in this study. 
In some instances, the DOJCRD investigated state patrols or county sheriff departments. 
Because I looked at violent crime rates specifically in cities, these agencies were not 
included in my assessment. I provide a table in Chapter 4 detailing decisions made for 
each agency. 
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Data 
For the study I used data from the FBI, Uniform Crime Rate (UCR). The UCR 
collects statistics from law enforcement agencies, compiles the information, and reports 
the findings. I gathered data for 3 years before and after the commencement of a 
DOJCRD investigation. The date the investigation commenced is available in the 
findings report and made public by the DOJCRD. I considered the year of 
commencement of the investigation and the subsequent 2 years as part of the “after” 
analysis, and the preceding 3 years in the “before” analysis. The analysis considered the 
before and after effects on violent crime rates and arrest rates using the national crime 
rate, provided by the UCR, as a nonequivalent control variable. 
 The data included Part I, violent crime offense rates, arrest rates, and the national 
crime rate. Part I, violent crime offenses include; murder and nonnegligent homicide, 
rape (legacy and revised), robbery, and aggravated assault. (See definitions in Chapter 1 
on how each crime is defined by the UCR) The violent crime rate was calculated by 
dividing the number of reported violent crimes by the total population of the city under 
analysis and then multiplying the result by 100,000.  
RVC ÷ TP * 100,000 = Violent Crime Arrest Rate 
RVC = Reported Violent Crime, TP = Total Population 
Arrest rates include all reported arrests made by an agency in the time frame under 
consideration. The purpose of using all arrests is to tease out the possibility of de-
policing. The arrest rate was calculated by dividing the number of reported arrests by the 
population of the city under scrutiny. The result is then multiplied by 100,000. 
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RA ÷ TP * 100,000 = Arrest Rate 
RA = Reported Arrests, TP = Total Population 
Statistical Analysis and Assumptions 
Using SPSS, I used a paired sample t-test to determine the mean difference between 
paired observations. This within-subjects design can analyze a continuous dependent 
variable, with one categorical independent variable on two levels, before and after an 
event. Despite the low sample size for each city, n = 3, Winter (2013) found the paired 
sample t-test can be applied with n’s as low as two when effect size is expected to be 
large. This assertion held true even in circumstances where combinations of unequal 
variance and sample size were present (Winter, 2013) For this study, three separate tests 
were run to determine relationships between the dependent variables, i.e., violent crime 
rate, arrest rate, and national crime rate, and the independent variable, the commencement 
of a DOJCRD investigation. The calculation included a point estimate and confidence 
interval of the mean difference between the two related groups, the statistical significance 
of the difference, and a measure of the effect size. The necessary assumptions for this 
analysis included: 
1) Dependent variables measured at the continuous level. Violent crime rate and 
arrest rate are all measured at the continuous level and are the dependent 
variables. I used a nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate, for 
comparison which is also measured at the continuous level. 
2) Independent variables with two related groups measured at the categorical 
level. The independent variable is the commencement of the DOJCRD 
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investigation and the two related groups will be the dependent variables 
measured before and after the investigation commences. 
3) There should be no significant outliers in the differences between the two 
related groups. I did find outliers in the data and after finding neither a data 
entry or measurement error, I compared the results of the paired-samples t-test 
with and without the outliers. I found a small difference in significance result 
and made the decision to continue using all data points despite the outliers. 
4) The distribution of the differences in the dependent variable between the 
related groups should be approximately normally distributed. Because the 
paired-samples t-test is robust to violations of normality, especially when 
using the entire population, violations of this assumption can somewhat be 
tolerated and still provide valid results. To test for this assumption, I used the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (i.e., p > .05) and reported the skewness values 
when I analyzed individual cities. When I analyzed the data in the aggregate I 
used a Q-Q Plot to determine normality and reported both the skewness and 
kurtosis values. 
5) I reported the mean, standard deviation, and 95% confidence intervals, which 
establish the magnitude of the mean difference and its likely range. For 
significance I considered the obtained t-value, degrees of freedom and the 
significance 2-tailed p-value. Findings of p < .05 indicated the mean 
difference between the two related groups was statistically significant, and the 
null hypothesis was rejected. Alternatively, findings of p > .05 indicated the 
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mean difference between the two related groups was not statistically 
significant, and the null hypothesis was accepted. I reported the results at 1, 2, 
and 3-year intervals to establish any pattern that may exist in change over 
time. 
Threats to Validity 
The use of data from the Uniform Crime Rate (UCR) is not without its 
limitations. Each year, more than 18,000 agencies contribute data to the FBI. The FBI 
recognizes the problems facing local law enforcement agencies and the possibility that 
for any number of reasons they cannot report. Non-reporting could make a difference, 
especially in the national crime rate. Another issue is the definitions of state crimes 
competing with definitions of crime for UCR purposes. Because crime definitions vary 
from state to state, the FBI requires agencies to report offenses not according to local and 
state statues, but according to the guidelines of the UCR. Although the FBI believes most 
agencies make a good faith effort to comply with these guidelines, there is very little 
follow-through on their part to make sure that guidelines are being followed (FBI, 2017). 
Another potential threat to validity is the data are based on reported crime and not 
necessarily actual crime. In Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago an event occurred 
involving an African American and police and this led to civil discourse. Desmond, 
Papachristos, and Kirk (2016) found that when highly publicized police use of force 
events occurred involving African American’s there was a significant decrease in the 
number of calls to 911 for police involvement in the Black community. Over time, the 
number of 911 calls returned to original levels. They argue that episodic events of highly 
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publicized police use of excessive force creates legal cynicism within the community and 
people turn to street justice, rather than to the police when legal intervention is needed. 
Pew Research Center reported the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) in 2016 
found only 42% of violent crime was reported to police (Gramlich, 2018). This 
disturbingly high number could certainly impact the findings of this study when it comes 
to violent crime data. This information is based off UCR data, which later I discuss the 
many issues surrounding their results, and an annual survey conducted by the BJS which 
is also fraught with many interpretation issues. Despite these assertions there may be a 
difference between true and reported crime and this could threaten validity. 
Due to potential issues with the data, I chose to only use violent crime rates. Part 
I, violent crime offenses include; murder and nonnegligent homicide, rape (legacy and 
revised), robbery, and aggravated assault. I believe the data are much cleaner when 
limited to only Part I, violent crime offenses because there is less ambiguity in defining 
Part I offenses as opposed to Part II offenses such as theft and assault. These are also 
crimes that are seemingly more likely to be reported to law enforcement despite legal 
cynicism. 
I used the national crime rate as a nonequivalent control variable. This decision 
was based on the variable having the ability to be a neutral indicator for comparison with 
an agency that has come under scrutiny of the DOJCRD. Others have attempted to look at 
cities with similar demographics for crime rate comparison, but this is fraught with 
problems (Rushin & Edwards, 2017). Trying to find two cities with nearly identical 
characteristics opens the door for validity issues. Just matching economic and race factors 
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alone creates many questionable data problems. The national crime rate has issues as 
well, however, fluctuations in the national crime rate occur for similar reasons that a local 
crime rate will. Multiple time series is used to tease out the differences over time with the 
emphasis on a specific point in time. If fluctuations are occurring in the local crime rate, 
before the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, and they differ significantly from 
the national crime rate, this may affect the validity gained using a nonequivalent control 
variable. 
Arrest rates will include all arrests made by a local law enforcement agency. The 
purpose of arrest rate analysis is to tease out information that may point toward de-
policing. There may be other reasons for changes in arrest rates, and this does go to 
validity. However, the theory behind de-policing is that officers are turning a blind eye to 
crimes they otherwise wouldn’t, and ultimately this is leading to more crime occurring. 
Again, multiple time series will be used to tease out the differences over time with the 
emphasis on a specific point in time. If decreases in arrest rates occur with the 
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, this strengthens the argument of de-
policing. 
Summary 
The intended goal of this study was to analyze the before and after effect on 
violent crime and arrest rates of cities with law enforcement agencies that have come 
under scrutiny by the DOJCRD. The population for the study includes all agencies that 
have come under the scrutiny of the DOJCRD for multiple allegations of patterns and 
practice of Constitutional or civil rights violations. The data is available through the 
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UCR, local law enforcement agencies, and the DOJCRD. For the study I used a 
quantitative, quasi-experimental, multiple time-series research design and SPSS for the 
analysis. Any changes to the data or analysis methods required the consensus of the 
Committee members and is thoroughly documented and reported. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to consider correlations that may exist between the 
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
violent crime and arrest rates of that city. The null hypothesis is that violent crime and 
arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of these investigations. 
Alternatively, violent crime and arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement 
of a DOJCRD patterns and practice investigation. The use of a nonequivalent control 
variable, the national crime rate, was used for comparison information. Arrest rates were 
considered to tease out the possibility of de-policing resulting from federal scrutiny. 
In this chapter, I present information about data collection and the issues 
surrounding data cleaning for accurate comparisons. I then present the results of the 
analysis on two levels, city by city and in the aggregate. Using this information to inform 
my decision, I present my final determinations regarding null hypothesis testing and my 
research questions. 
Data Collection 
Upon IRB approval (02-13-18-0631789), my first step in data collection was to 
identify the cities and time frames for the analysis. To do this I looked at several sources 
for verification because the DOJCRD site was ambiguous at best. As the research 
evolved I found there were some credible sources for cross referencing such as the 
University of Michigan Law School (Civil Rights Litigation Clearing House, n.d.) and 
Frontline, Fixing the Force (Frontline’s Enterprise Journalism Group, n.d.). Ultimately, I 
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determined that since given the ability by Congress to investigate law enforcement 
agencies in 1994, the DOJCRD has conducted 69 investigations. Not all these 
investigations are multi-faceted patterns and practice investigations. For instance, in one 
case, a single minority employee alleged discrimination in the promotional process and 
this prompted the DOJCRD to investigate. I began by examining the cause for each 
investigation and deciding if it met the requirements for my study. 
After exhaustively researching the cause of DOJCRD intervention, I then began 
looking at cities that I had identified being within the parameters of the research. I had to 
eliminate some agencies because they are state or county agencies, and I could not assess 
individual cities violent crime rates based on broad data from these agencies. Once I 
identified the cities included in the research, I began collecting violent crime and arrest 
data.  
I found data collection more difficult than I had anticipated. I assumed that UCR 
data was accurate, but I found some instances that it was not. I also anticipated the data 
were gathered consistently from agency to agency, but I found this was also not the case. 
In several instances, the UCR had violent crime and arrest data for each month as 
anticipated, but in many cases, they only had annual data. Another difficulty was that 
despite DOJCRD over-sight there was no UCR data available for several agencies. 
Additionally, no consent decree or memo of understanding that I reviewed included a 
provision requiring an agency to report statistics to the UCR. 
To resist reducing my sample size, I contacted many agencies where data was not 
available through the UCR. Most of the time this required a Freedom of Information Act 
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form submission. Although all agencies responded to my request, many were unable to 
provide data because it was not available. I found the older the data I was requesting, the 
more likely they would not be able to find it. As with the UCR, in many instances, I 
could get violent crime data but was not able to get arrest data. Just as was found with the 
UCR, many times the data was only available on an annual basis rather than monthly. 
Because of this, my analysis changed from considering 36 months before and after the 
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation to 3 years before and after the 
commencement. I did have occasions when the data by the UCR was inaccurate, and in 
these instances, I chose to decrease sample size if I could not confirm the data through 
the individual agency. 
For both research questions, I examined changes in the mean before and after the 
commencement of the DOJCRD investigation. I used three data points, n = 3, at 1, 2, and 
3 years before and after the commencement of the DOJCRD investigation. The year 
listed by the DOJCRD for when the investigation began was used as Year 1 of the post 
investigation data. Ultimately, I analyzed violent crime rate data from 35 cities 
individually and 37 cities as a whole. Baltimore and Chicago did not have 2017 data as of 
the time of this research, so I was limited to data for 2 years in these cities. I analyzed 
arrest rates for only 25 cities due to unavailable data through the UCR or local law 
enforcement agency. I have provided a list of agency analysis decisions and any issues 
with data for all agencies considered in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
 
Agency Analysis Decisions, Explanations, and Data Issues 
Agency Analysis (Yes, No) Reasoning Issues 
Torrance, CA, May 1995 No 
No action taken by the DOJ and 
no information available as to the 
extent of the investigation. 
 
Adelanto, CA, June 1995 No 
No action taken by the DOJ and 
no information available as to the 
extent of the investigation. 
 
Pittsburgh, PA, April 1996 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
New Orleans, LA, April 1996 
Yes, however only crime 
data is available. 
 
The UCR has no data 
currently available for 
arrests. New Orleans 
offered the data for a 
considerable price. 
New Jersey State Police, April 
1996 
No 
The population for this study only 
includes “cities” that have come 
under scrutiny of the DOJ. 
 
Los Angeles, CA, July 1996 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Steubenville, OH, September 
1996 
No 
No data reported to the UCR and 
currently unavailable through the 
agency. 
 
Illinois State Police No 
The population for this study only 
includes “cities” that have come 
under scrutiny of the DOJ. 
 
Montgomery, MD, June 1996 
Yes, however only crime 
data is available. 
Arrest data not available through 
the UCR or MCPD. 
 
Beverly Hills, Ca, February 
1997 
No 
There is no documentation 
available through the DOJ on this 
investigation and its status is 
closed. 
 
Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 
FL April 1997 
No 
The population for this study only 
includes “cities” that have come 
under scrutiny of the DOJ. 
 
New York Police Department 
(Eastern Dist.), NY, December 
1997 
No 
UCR stats are not broke down by 
NYPD district. NYPD has the 
stats but stated there are no 
specific boundaries. 
 
Buffalo, NY, December 1997 No 
The investigation was for pepper 
spray use only and not an agency 
wide patterns and practice 
investigation. 
 
Columbus, OH, March 1998 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Eastpointe, MI, March 1998 No 
Crime data is currently 
unavailable for all years prior to 
the investigation and no arrest 
data is available. 
 
Washington, D.C., February 
1999 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
(table continues) 
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Agency Analysis (Yes, No) Reasoning Issues 
New York (Southern District), 
NY, March 1999 
No 
UCR stats are not broke down 
by NYPD district. NYPD has 
the stats but stated there are no 
specific boundaries. 
 
Charleston, WV, March 1999 
Yes, however only crime data 
analysis. 
Arrest data through the UCR is 
unavailable and the agency 
confirmed no arrest data is 
available. 
 
Prince George’s County, MD, 
July 1999 
Yes, however only crime data 
analysis. 
Arrest data is not available for 
two years. 
 
Riverside, CA, July 1999 No 
This investigation was 
monitored by the DOJ but 
conducted by a State agency. 
 
Mount Prospect, IL, April 2000 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Highland Park, IL, May 2000 
Yes, however only crime data 
analysis. 
No arrest data available through 
the UCR or HPPD. 
 
Cleveland, OH, August 2000 No 
This was a use of force 
complaint and not an agency 
wide patterns and practice 
investigation. 
 
Prince George’s County, MD, 
October 2000 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Tulsa, OK, February, 2001 No 
This was an internal 
investigation brought by one 
officer alleging discriminatory 
treatment against him. 
 
Cincinnati, OH, May 2001 
Yes, however only crime data 
analysis. 
Arrest data is only available for 
one year through the UCR and 
CPD. 
 
Detroit, MI, May 2001 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Schenectady, NY, April 2001 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Portland, ME, May 2002 
Yes, however only crime 
data analysis. 
Arrest data is not available for 
two years through the UCR or 
PPD. 
 
Miami, FL, May 2002 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Providence, RI, December 2002 No 
No action taken by the DOJ and 
no information available as to 
the extent of the investigation. 
 
Villa Rica, GA, December 2002 No 
Crime and arrest data not 
available through the UCR or 
agency for 2001 
 
Alabaster, AL, March 2003 No 
Crime and arrest data not 
available through the UCR or 
agency for years 2000 and 2005 
 
Bakersfield, CA, June 2003 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Island, 
March 2004 
No 
Crime and arrest data not 
available through the UCR or 
agency. 
 
St. Croix, Virgin Island, March 
2004 
No 
Crime and arrest data not 
available through the UCR or 
agency. 
 
Beacon, NY, August 2004 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Warren, OH, December 2004 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
(table continues) 
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Agency Analysis (Yes, No) Reasoning Issues 
Easton., PA, October 2005 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 
FL, January 2007 
No 
The population for this study 
only includes “cities” that have 
come under scrutiny of the 
DOJ. 
 
Austin, TX, May 2007 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Yonkers, NY August 2007 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Puerto Rico Police Department, 
July 2008 
No 
Crime and arrest data not 
available through the UCR or 
agency. 
 
Lorain, OH, November 2008 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Harvey, Illinois, December 2008 
Yes, however only crime 
data analysis. 
No arrest data available through 
the UCR or HPD. 
 
Escambia County Sheriff’s 
Office, FL, January 2009 
No 
The population for this study 
only includes “cities” that have 
come under scrutiny of the 
DOJ. 
 
Maricopa County, AZ, March 
2009 
No 
The population for this study 
only includes “cities” that have 
come under scrutiny of the 
DOJ. 
 
Inglewood, CA, March 2009 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Suffolk County, NY, September 
2009 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
East Haven, CT, September 
2009 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
New Orleans, LA, May 2010 
Yes, however only crime 
data analysis. 
 
The UCR has no data 
currently available for 
arrests. New Orleans 
offered the data for a 
considerable price. 
Alamance County, NC, June 
2010 
No 
The population for this study 
only includes “cities” that have 
come under scrutiny of the 
DOJ. 
 
Seattle, WA, March 2011 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Colorado City, AZ, April 2011 No 
The only data available through 
the UCR and the agency is from 
2009, 2010 and 2011. 
 
Newark, NJ, May 2011 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Portland, OR, June 2011 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Los Angeles County Sheriffs 
Officer, Antelope Valley, CA, 
August 2011 
No 
The population for this study 
only includes “cities” that have 
come under scrutiny of the 
DOJ. 
 
Miami, FL, November 2011 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Meridian, MI, December 2001 No 
This was not an agency wide 
patterns and practice 
investigation this was for 
juveniles arrested from a high 
school. 
 
(table continues) 
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Agency Analysis (Yes, No) Reasoning Issues 
Missoula Police Department, 
MT April 2012 
 
No 
This was not an agency wide 
patterns and practice 
investigation. This was for how 
the agency is handling sexual 
assault cases. 
 
University of Montana, MT 
April 2012 
No 
This was not an agency wide 
patterns and practice 
investigation. This was for how 
the agency is handling sexual 
assault cases. 
 
Albuquerque, NM, November 
2012 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Cleveland, OH, March 2013 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Ferguson, MO, September 2014 
Yes, both crime and arrest 
data available. 
  
Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s 
Office, LA 
No 
This was not an agency wide 
patterns and practice 
investigation. This investigation 
involved detention hold policies 
of the local police and sheriff’s 
department. 
 
Ville Platte, LA, April 2015 No 
This was not an agency wide 
patterns and practice 
investigation. This investigation 
involved detention hold policies 
of the local police and sheriff’s 
department. 
 
Baltimore, MD, May 2015 
Yes, in aggregate analysis 
only. 
 
Limited to two years 
because 2017 data is 
currently unavailable. 
Chicago, IL, December 2015 
Yes, in aggregate analysis 
only. 
 
Limited to two years 
because 2017 data is 
currently unavailable. 
Orange County Sheriffs Officer, 
FL, December 2016 
No 
This was not an agency wide 
investigation. This was 
concerning the use of jail house 
informants by the sheriff’s 
department and District 
Attorney’s office. 
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Results 
The analysis began with testing for the assumptions of no significant outliers and 
distribution of the differences in the dependent variables, violent crime rate, arrest rate, 
and national crime rate being approximately normally distributed. Because the 
assumption of outliers is tested on the difference scores between the two paired 
observations, I used SPSS to compute the differences. I chose to use boxplots to assess 
for outliers due to the number of tests being conducted and a low N. In all 35 tests I found 
no outliers in the data as assessed by inspection of the boxplots. 
For tests of normality I intended to record kurtosis values due to the value of 
leptokurtic and platykurtic distribution data; however, individual cities ultimately had < 8 
pre- and post-data points due to annual reporting versus monthly reporting. I will report 
kurtosis values when analyzing data in the aggregate. Skewness results are provided for 
individual cities and for further support for testing of normality I chose the Shapiro-Wilk 
test rather than a Normal Q-Q Plot because the sample size on each test was < 50. For the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, I used the commonly accepted p > .05 indicating the data is normally 
distributed and accepting the null hypothesis. Alternatively, if I found p < .05 the data 
was considered not normally distributed thus rejecting the null hypothesis and creating 
the need for addressing violations of normality. In testing the individual cities, the df = 3 
in all the Shapiro-Wilk tests and df = 2 in all paired samples t-test so this information was 
excluded from the table. In all, I found seven tests where p < .05 from the Shapiro-Wilk 
test of normality. Considering there are multiple tests being conducted on each city, and 
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then again in the aggregate, and the fact that the paired samples t-test is considered robust 
to violations of normality, I chose to continue without transforming the data.  
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Table 2 
 
Tests for Distribution Normality 
City Variable Skewness Shapiro-Wilk Statistic Shapiro-Wilk Sig. 
Pittsburgh, PA, April 1996 
CR -1.73 .765 .034 
AR .108 1.00 .960 
NCR .696 .981 .737 
New Orleans, LA, April 
1996 
CR 1.17 .940 .527 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR 1.49 .981 .737 
Los Angeles, CA, July 1996 
CR 1.14 .944 .543 
AR -1.67 .825 .176 
NCR .696 .981 .737 
Montgomery, MD, June 
1996 
CR .542 .989 .797 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR .696 .981 .737 
Columbus, OH, March 1998 
CR 1.73 .754 .009 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR -.627 .985 .764 
Washington, D.C., February 
1999 
CR -.310 .996 .886 
AR .345 .996 .872 
NCR -1.42 .901 .388 
Charleston, WV, March 
1999 
CR -1.60 .853 .248 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR -1.42 .901 .388 
Prince George’s County, 
MD, July 1999 
CR -1.67 .826 .177 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR -1.42 .901 .388 
Mount Prospect, IL, April 
2000 
CR -.413 .994 .847 
AR -.729 .979 .723 
NCR -.318 .996 .882 
Highland Park, IL, May 2000 
CR 1.73 .757 .015 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR .173 .999 .936 
Prince George’s County, 
MD, October 2000 
CR 1.73 .760 .021 
AR -1.38 .908 .411 
NCR .173 .999 .936 
Cincinnati, OH, May 2001 
CR 1.29 .924 .467 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR 1.06 .952 .579 
Detroit, MI, May 2001 
CR 1.60 .853 .249 
AR -1.49 .887 .344 
NCR 1.06 .952 .579 
Schenectady, NY, April 
2001 
CR -1.32 .918 .446 
AR .987 .960 .614 
NCR 1.06 .952 .579 
Portland, ME, May 2002 
CR -1.59 .856 .257 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR 1.68 .819 .160 
Miami, FL, May 2002 
CR -.961 .962 .625 
AR .677 .982 .744 
NCR 1.68 .819 .160 
Bakersfield, CA, June 2003 
CR 1.02 .957 .599 
AR -1.68 .819 .161 
NCR -1.35 .914 .432 
Beacon, NY, August 2004 
CR .996 .959 .610 
AR 1.16 .942 .535 
NCR -.087 1.00 .968 
(table continues) 
 
60 
 
City Variable Skewness Shapiro-Wilk Statistic Shapiro-Wilk Sig. 
Warren, OH, December 2004 
CR -.647 .984 .756 
AR 1.36 .911 .423 
NCR -.432 .993 .839 
Easton., PA, October 2005 
CR 1.60 .852 .246 
AR -1.54 .872 .300 
NCR -.432 .993 .839 
Austin, TX, May 2007 
CR 1.39 .906 .404 
AR -.855 .971 .672 
NCR .830 .972 .682 
Yonkers, NY August 2007 
CR -.775 .976 .705 
AR -1.73 .770 .044 
NCR .830 .972 .682 
Lorain, OH, November 2008 
CR -1.50 .882 .330 
AR -1.57 .865 .282 
NCR -.446 .992 .834 
Harvey, Illinois, December 
2008 
CR -.568 .988 .787 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR -.389 .994 .856 
Inglewood, CA, March 2009 
CR -1.40 .905 .400 
AR 1.04 .954 .589 
NCR -.389 .994 .787 
Suffolk County, NY, 
September 2009 
CR .438 .993 .837 
AR .785 .976 .700 
NCR -.389 .994 .787 
East Haven, CT, September 
2009 
CR -.087 1.00 .971 
AR .086 1.00 .968 
NCR -.389 .994 .787 
New Orleans, LA, May 2010 
CR 1.17 .940 .528 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR -1.21 .936 .510 
Seattle, WA, March 2011 
CR 1.63 .842 .221 
AR .419 .993 .844 
NCR 1.07 .951 .576 
Newark, NJ, May 2011 
CR .168 .999 .938 
AR .637 .984 .760 
NCR 1.07 .951 .576 
Portland, OR, June 2011 
CR 1.41 .903 .394 
AR -.573 .987 .785 
NCR 1.07 .951 .576 
Miami, FL, November 2011 
CR 1.72 .789 .089 
AR -.468 .992 .826 
NCR 1.07 .951 .576 
Albuquerque, NM, 
November 2012 
CR -1.73 .761 .023 
AR -.076 1.00 .972 
NCR .490 .991 .818 
Cleveland, OH, March 2013 
CR -1.73 .755 .011 
AR 1.73 .762 .026 
NCR -.752 .978 .714 
Ferguson, MO, September 
2014 
CR .363 .995 .865 
AR NA NA NA 
NCR -1.71 .792 .096 
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Analysis of the individual cities unveiled violent crime rate means decreasing 
after the commencement of the DOJCRD investigation in 20 cities and increasing in 15 
cities. However, during the same time frame, the national crime rate mean decreased at a 
much greater rate. Arrest rates were found to decline in 23 of 25 cities analyzed, and in 
all but two of the cities the effect size was medium to large. To establish the magnitude of 
the difference between the two variables, I used Cohen’s d to indicate effect size. For 
interpretation I used the values 0.2 = small, 0.5 = medium and 0.8 = large. I found a large 
effect size, in 13 cities when violent crime rates were decreasing and 10 cities when the 
rate was increasing. There was medium effect size in five cities when the violent crime 
rate was falling and five cities when it was rising. The other three cities showed a small 
effect size with two decreasing and one increasing.  
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Table 3 
 
City by City Analysis 
City Var. Pre and 
Post M 
M SD 95% CI t Sig. d 
Pittsburgh, PA, 
April 1996 
CR 
 
1103 
275 87 [59, 492] 5.47 .032 3.16 
827 
AR 
5656 
1409 760 [-479, 3296] 3.21 .085 1.85 
4247 
NCR 
5378 
501 344 [-354, 1356] 2.52 .128 1.46 
4877 
New Orleans, LA, 
April 1996 
CR 
2061 
595 205 [86, 1104] 5.03 .037 2.90 
1466 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
5378  
501 
344 [-354, 1356] 2.52 
 
.128 
 
1.46 4877 
Los Angeles, CA, 
July 1996 
CR 
2156 
572 400 [-422, 1566] 2.48 .132 1.43 
1584 
AR 
3439 
-967 947 [-3320, 385] -1.77 .219 -1.02 
4406 
NCR 
5378 
501 344 [-354, 1356] 2.52 .128 1.46 
4877 
Montgomery, MD, 
June 1996 
CR 
281 
27 18 [-17, 71] 2.63 .119 1.5 
254 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
5378 
501 344 [-354, 1356] 2.52 .128 1.5 
4877 
Columbus, OH, 
March 1998 
CR 
988 
149 57 [7, 291] 4.53 .045 2.61 
838 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
5096 
761 422 [-288, 1810] 3.12 .089 1.80 
4336 
Washington, D.C., 
February 1999 
CR 
2071 
490 386 [-470, 1450] 2.20 .159 1.26 
1581 
AR 
12051 
2078 1463 [-1557, 5713] 2.46 .133 1.42 
9973 
NCR 
4877 
692 303 [-62, 1445] 3.95 .058 2.28 
4185 
Charleston, WV, 
March 1999 
CR 
1068 
61 90 [-163, 284] 1.17 .364 .68 
1007 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
4877 
692 303 [-62, 1446] 3.95 .058 2.28 
4185 
Prince George’s 
County, MD, July 
1999 
CR 
1064 
-199 461 [-1344, 945] -.750 .532 -0.43 
1263 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
4877 
692 303 [-62, 1446] 3.95 .058 2.28 
4185 
Mount Prospect, 
IL, April 2000 
CR 
95 
-54 31 [-130, 23] -3.02 .095 -1.74 
148 
AR 
1000 
9 214 [-522, 540] .072 .949 .04 
991 
NCR 
4603 
466 350 [-404, 1335] 2.31 .148 1.33 
4137 
Highland Park, IL, 
May 2000 
CR 
78 
3 37 [-89, 95] .133 .906 .08 
75 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
4603 
466 330 [-355, 1287] 244 .135 1.41 
4137 
(table continues) 
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City Var. Pre and 
Post M 
M SD 95% CI t Sig. d 
Prince George’s 
County, MD, 
October 2000 
CR 
986 
-33 46 [-146, 80] -1.25 .337 -.72 
1019 
AR 
887 
242 133 [-88, 571] 3.16 .087 1.82 
645 
NCR 
4603 
466 330 [-355, 1287] 2.44 .135 1.41 
4137 
Cincinnati, OH, 
May 2001 
CR 
948 
-255 352 [-1130, 620] -1.25 .336 -.72 
1203 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
4336 
217 300 [-529, 964] 1.25 .337 .72 
4118 
Detroit, MI, May 
2001 
CR 
2355 
261 181 [-188, 711] 2.50 .130 1.44 
2094 
AR 
6674 
1825 1444 [-1763, 5414] 2.19 .160 1.26 
4849 
NCR 
4336 
217 300 [-529, 964] 1.25 .337 .72 
4118 
Schenectady, NY, 
April 2001 
CR 
696 
-126 88 [-345, 92] -2.48 .131 -1.43 
823 
AR 
6756 
16 1289 [-3186, 3218] .022 .985 .01 
6740 
NCR 
4336 
217 300 [-529, 964] 1.25 .337 .72 
4118 
Portland, ME, May 
2002 
CR 
302 
-52 44 [-161, 56] -2.07 .174 -1.18 
354 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
4185 
129 139 [-216, 475]  475 1.60 .249 
4055 
Miami, FL, May 
2002 
CR 
2072 
252 202 [-248, 753] 2.17 .162 1.25 
1820 
AR 
13558 
3257 1581 [-672, 7185] 3.57 .070 2.06 
10301 
NCR 
4185 
129 139 [-216, 475] 1.61 .249 .93 
4055 
Bakersfield, CA, 
June 2003 
CR 
347 
-280 113 [-560, .41] -4.30 .050 -2.48 
627 
AR 
4863 
-473 340 [-1318, 373] -2.41 .138 -1.39 
5335 
NCR 
4137 
156 87 [-60, 372] 3.10 .090 1.79 
3982 
Beacon, NY, 
August 2004 
CR 
446 
-12 34 [-97, 73] -.603 .608 -.35 
457 
AR 
5258 
2152 2198 [-3307, 7611] 1.70 .232 .98 
3106 
NCR 
4117 
223 134 [-111, 555] 2.87 .103 1.66 
3895 
Warren, OH, 
December 2004 
CR 
834 
-342 373 [-1269, 584] -1.59 .253 -.92 
1176 
AR 
5158 
1375 394 [395, 2353] 6.04 .026 3.49 
3784 
NCR 
4056 
243 159 [-153, 640] 2.64 .118 1.53 
3813 
Easton., PA, 
October 2005 
CR 
698 
89 115 [-198, 375] 1.33 .315 .77 
609 
AR 
3475 
65 618 [-1471, 1601] .182 .873 .11 
3410 
NCR 
4056 
243 159 [-153, 640] 2.64 .118 1.53 
3813 
(table continues) 
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City Var. Pre and 
Post M 
M SD 95% CI t Sig. d 
Austin, TX, May 
2007 
CR 
510 
-19 18 [-64, 26] -1.78 .216 -1.06 
529 
AR 
6815 
-878 750 [-2741, 985] -2.03 .180 -1.17 
7693 
NCR 
3895 
274 220 [-273, 820] 2.15 .164 1.25 
3622 
Yonkers, NY 
August 2007 
CR 
488 
29 27 [-40, 97] 1.81 .213 1.07 
460 
AR 
3014 
-43 95 [-279, 194] -.774 .520 -0.45 
3056 
NCR 
3895 
274 220 [-273, 820] 2.15 .164 1.25 
3622 
Lorain, OH, 
November 2008 
CR 
466 
-71 50 [-196, 55] -2.43 .136 -1.42 
537 
AR 
5238 
1233 858 [-899, 3364] 2.49 .131 1.44 
4051 
NCR 
3813 
318 245 [-291, 927] 2.25 .154 1.30 
3495 
Harvey, Illinois, 
December 2008 
CR 
1926 
192 318 [-598, 983] 1.05 .405 .60 
1733 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
3736 
366 156 [-22, 755] 4.06 .056 2.35 
3369 
Inglewood, CA, 
March 2009 
CR 
893 
87 123 [-220, 393] 1.22 .348 .71 
806 
AR 
3325 
694 170 [272, 1115] 7.08 .019 4.08 
2631 
NCR 
3736 
366 156 [-22, 755] 4.06 .056 2.35 
3369 
Suffolk County, 
NY, September 
2009 
CR 
172 
19 29 [-53, 91] 1.31 .376 .66 
153 
AR 
2582 
348 305 [-407, 1104] 1.98 .186 1.14 
2234 
NCR 
3736 
366 156 [-22, 755] 4.06 .056 2.35 
3369 
East Haven, CT, 
September 2009 
CR 
145 
26 23 [-31, 83] 1.94 .192 1.13 
119 
AR 
3791 
1456 1242 [-1631, 4542] 2.03 .192 1.17 
2335 
NCR 3736 
366 156 [-22, 755] 4.06 .056 2.35 
3369 
New Orleans, LA, 
May 2010 
CR 
1120 
333 374 [-597, 1263] 1.54 .263 .89 
787 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
3622 
322 186 [-140, 784] 3.00 .095 1.73 
3300 
Seattle, WA, 
March 2011 
CR 
598 
5 29 [-67, 76] .276 .808 .17 
594 
AR 
3476 
995 482 [-201, 2191] 3.58 .070 2.06 
2481 
NCR 
3495 
275 256 [-360, 910] 1.86 .204 1.07 
3220 
Newark, NJ, May 
2011 
CR 
974 
-221 94 [-454, 12] -4.08 .055 -2.35 
1195 
AR 
7813 
3408 1472 [-249, 7065] 4.01 .057 2.32 
4405 
NCR 
3495 
275 256 [-360, 910] 1.86 .204 1.07 
3220 
(table continues) 
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City Var. Pre and 
Post M 
M SD 95% CI t Sig. d 
Portland, OR, June 
2011 
CR 
566 
61 70 [-111, 234] 1.53 .266 .87 
505 
AR 
4129 
1013 624 [-1671, 3697] 1.62 .246 1.62 
3116 
NCR 
3495 
275 256 [-360, 910] 1.86 .204 1.07 
3220 
Miami, FL, 
November 2011 
CR 
1248 
64 77 [-126, 255] 1.46 .283 .83 
1184 
AR 
8365 
1315 352 [440, 2189] 6.47 .023 3.74 
7050 
NCR 
3495 
275 256 [-360, 910] 1.86 .204 1.07 
3220 
Albuquerque, NM, 
November 2012 
CR 
773 
-30 73 [-210, 151] -.710 .551 -.41 
802 
AR 
5932 
1443 926 [-856, 3743] 2.70 .114 1.56 
4489 
NCR 
3369 
265 242 [-338, 867] 1.89 .199 1.10 
3105 
Cleveland, OH, 
March 2013 
CR 
1383 
-143 81 [-346, 59] -3.05 .093 -1.77 
1527 
AR 
2855 
781 638 [-805, 2366] 2.12 .168 1.22 
2074 
NCR 
3300 
318 163 [-86, 723] 3.39 .077 1.95 
2981 
Ferguson, MO, 
September 2014 
CR 
446 
-306 230 [-877, 265] -2.30 .148 -1.33 
752 
AR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NCR 
3220 
-17 736 [-1844, 1811] -.039 .973 -0.02 
3237 
 
Despite large effect sizes on most of the results, the change in violent crime rate 
was statistically significant in only Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, New Orleans, Louisiana, 
Columbus, Ohio, and Bakersfield, California. Of these four cities, three were 
significantly reducing their violent crime rate’s while Bakersfield was significantly 
increasing its violent crime rate. Despite arrest rates being down in most cities with a 
large effects size, only three cities indicated a statistically significant result: Warren, 
Ohio, Inglewood, California, and Miami, Florida. Given wide confidence intervals in 
most of the results, and a small n = 3, I didn’t feel I had enough evidence to support 
accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis at this point. Because wide confidence intervals 
often indicate the need for larger sample size, I decided to analyze the data in the 
aggregate. 
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Analysis of Aggregate Data 
For hypothesis testing of the aggregate data, I again used a paired samples t-test. 
Before conducting the analysis, I tested for the assumptions of no significant outliers and 
distribution of the differences in the dependent variable’s being approximately normally 
distributed. Using boxplots to identify outliers, SPSS detected nine outliers with four 
extreme outliers in the violent crime rate variable, two outliers in the arrest rate variable 
and five outliers with the national crime rate variable. To determine the effect the 
extreme outliers were having on the mean of the violent crime rate variable I eliminated 
all extreme outlier data points from the data set and ran an analysis. I found a small 
increase in the significance level. Based on this information I decided to continue using 
all data points. 
 Because n > 50 (violent crime rate n = 109, arrest rate n = 76, national crime rate 
n = 109) I chose to use a Q-Q Plot for analysis of normal distribution. I found in all three 
analyses, i.e. violent crime rate, arrest rate, and national crime rate, the data were 
normally distributed based off Q-Q Plot observation. I also considered skew and kurtosis 
levels well within allowable limits for each variable: violent crime rate (skewness =.604, 
SE .231, kurtosis = 2.66, SE .459), arrest rate (skewness = .829, SE .276, kurtosis = 1.04, 
SE .545) and national crime rate (skewness = .022, SE .231, kurtosis = 1.93, SE .459). 
Correlations analysis also indicate the paired samples t-test is appropriate (violent crime 
rate, r = .902, p < .001, arrest rate, r = .883, p < .001 and national crime rate, r = .896, p < 
.001).  
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Results of Aggregate Testing 
 Violent crime rate means decreased from before the DOJCRD investigation 
commenced (M = 932, SD = 636) as opposed to (M = 901, SD = 534) but were not 
statistically significant M = 31, SD = 277, 95% CI [-21, 84], t(108) = 1.17, p > .05 @ 
.244, d = 0.11. When compared to the nonequivalent control variable, national crime rate, 
which also decreased, there is a remarkable difference, (M = 4163, SD = 669) as opposed 
to (M = 3803, SD = 584) and was found statistically significant, M = 360, SD = 297, 95% 
CI [303,416], t(108) = 12.63, p < .05 @ .001, d = 1.21. Not only was the violent crime 
rate difference not statistically significant, the effect size was very low. Comparatively, 
the national crime rate mean during the same time frame was found significantly 
decreasing with a large effect size. For comparison, the violent crime rate mean 
decreased by 3% before and after the commencement of the investigation while during 
the same time frame the national crime rate mean decreased at a three-times greater rate 
of 9%.  
Arrest rates means also decreased post DOJCRD investigation (M = 5281, SD = 
2998) as opposed to (M = 4261, SD = 2481) and were statistically significant, M = 1020, 
SD = 1418, 95% CI [696, 1344], t(75) = 6.27, p < .05 @ .001, d = 0.72. Not only were 
arrest rate means significantly decreasing pre- to post-DOJCRD investigation, they were 
nearing a large effect size. 
Research Questions and Hypothesis Results 
For this study I considered two research questions and hypothesis to evaluate each 
question: 
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RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
violent crime rates? 
H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of 
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a 
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
 Considering the evidence from the analysis of the individual cities and then in the 
aggregate, I must conclude that although violent crime rates were falling, the results were 
not statistically significant, and the effect was trivial at best. Therefore, I accept the null 
hypothesis that violent crime rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a 
DOJCRD investigation. However, when analyzed in the aggregate, most cities that came 
under the scrutiny of DOJCRD investigations did not experience decreases in their 
violent crime rates as the rest of the nation did during the same time frame. These results 
also don’t consider the possibility of non-reported crime. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
arrest rates? 
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
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 The evidence supports a relationship between DOJCRD investigations and agency 
arrest rates. When considered individually, arrest rates fell in 23 of 25 cities analyzed 
with a mostly large effect size. In the aggregate, arrest rates declined significantly with 
medium to large effect size. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative that arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation and find the arrest rate difference declining significantly. 
Additional Observations of the Data 
For this study I analyzed all available data since the DOJCRD was granted this 
power in 1994. In that time the United States had three Presidential administrations, 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama. Knowing that ideologies change with Presidential 
administrations, I compared the data for the years of each President. 
During the years of the Clinton administration (1993 – 2001, however the first 
city analyzed was in 1996) a total of 11 cities were analyzed. Of the 11 cities, eight were 
found to increase their violent crime rates while the other three decreased. Arrest rate 
data was available for only five of the 11 cities. I found arrest rates increasing in one city 
and decreasing in the other four. 
For the Bush administration (2001 – 2009) I analyzed 13 cities for their violent 
crime rates and 10 cities arrest rates. I found violent crime rates increasing in six cities 
and decreasing in seven cities. Arrest rates increased in three cities but decreased in the 
other seven. 
Under the Obama administration (2009 – 2017) I analyzed 13 cities violent crime 
rates and 11 cities arrest rates. I found six cities where violent crime was increasing and 
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seven cities where it was decreasing. Arrest rates in all 11 cities decreased. The data 
clearly show that starting in 2012, violent crime rates in the cities I analyzed began to 
increase remarkably, post commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. This phenomenon 
becomes more evident with time and by 2017, violent crime rate means differences are 
consistently rising at an alarming rate and arrest rates have dropped off dramatically post 
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. This includes the years the DOJCRD 
investigated, Ferguson, Missouri, Baltimore, Maryland, and Chicago, Illinois. 
The data support a conclusion that DOJCRD investigations are negatively 
impacting violent crime and arrest rates at an increasing rate. More investigation is 
needed to determine a potential cause, but the data support the notion that as Presidential 
administrations change and perhaps ideologies change, the impact of DOJCRD 
investigations on violent crime and arrest rates are affected. 
Summary 
The results indicate some correlation exist between local violent crime rates and 
the commencement of a DOJCRD patterns and practice investigation. Although the mean 
does decrease before and after the investigations commenced, the difference is not 
statistically significant and has a low effect size. Comparatively, the national crime rate 
during the same time frame did decrease significantly with a large effect size. Although 
local violent crime rates for cities under scrutiny of the DOJCRD were found 
insignificantly decreasing, crime rates in the United States were decreasing significantly 
during the same time frame. Arrest rates decreased significantly with a medium to large 
effect size when the DOJCRD commenced their investigation supporting the notion of 
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de-policing. Both violent crime rates and arrest rates are being negatively affected at an 
increasing rate with time. Some correlation exists with changes in Presidential 
administrations. Graphing of the data are available in Appendix A and for emphasis, I 
added trend lines. 
 In the final chapter, I summarize the study and discuss the implications of the 
results. I provide discussion on what can be gleaned from the results of this study and 
possible considerations for further research. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Three cities—Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; and Chicago, Illinois—
have experienced significant increases in their violent crime rates and substantial 
decreases in their arrest rates while the national crime rate is falling. A common thread 
shared by these three cities is their local law enforcement agencies had come under the 
scrutiny of the DOJCRD. This quantitative study was designed to analyze differences in 
violent crime rates and arrest rates in all cities with law enforcement agencies that have 
come under the scrutiny of the DOJCRD. The purpose of this research was to add to the 
literature questioning why in some areas of the country crime rates are soaring while the 
national crime rate is falling. Through research and data collection, I also unveiled the 
need for further research into the efficacy of the DOJCRD due to concerns of bias, 
questionable investigations, and enormous costs. The remainder of this chapter includes 
an overview of the study and the information discovered during data collection. I first 
provide answers to the research questions through hypothesis testing results and examine 
how these results add to the literature regarding substantial increases in crime in certain 
areas of the country. 
Summary of Key Findings 
Using data from 3 years before and 3 years after the commencement of a 
DOJCRD investigation (n = 3) I analyzed 35 cities’ violent crime rates and 25 cities’ 
arrest rates. I found that the mean for violent crime rates decreased but at a nonsignificant 
level with low effect size. Using the national crime rate as a nonequivalent control 
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variable, I found the mean decreased significantly during the same time frame at a 
medium to large effect size, and at three-times the rate of cities under DOJCRD scrutiny. 
Violent crime rates in the wake of these investigations became progressively worse 
beginning in 2012, and by 2017 the pre- and post-differences are at an alarming rate. 
 To tease out the possibility of de-policing with the commencement DOJCRD 
investigations, I analyzed arrest rates within the same time frames. I found arrest rate 
means decreased at a statistically significant rate with a medium to large effect size. All 
results held true when analyzed city by city or in the aggregate. As with violent crime 
rates, arrest rates over time have become increasingly worse. All cities analyzed between 
2009 and 2017, the years of the Obama administration, had significantly reduced arrest 
rates. 
Interpretation of Findings 
I analyzed 35 cities’ violent crime rates and 25 cities’ arrest rates for 3 years 
before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. The difference in the 
number of cities analyzed was due to unavailability of arrest data for some cities. Using a 
standard p < .05 with 95% confidence levels to reject the null hypothesis, and then 
considering the effect size with means percentage differences for a thorough picture of 
the data results, I come to the following conclusions. 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
violent crime rates? 
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H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of 
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a 
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
In the city by city analysis, I found violent crime rate means decreasing in 20 
cities and increasing in 15 when comparing data before and after the commencement of 
the DOJCRD investigation. However, despite medium to large effect sizes, the difference 
in violent crime rates was not statistically significant.  
The results from the analysis of the data in the aggregate were similar with a non-
statistically significant result, p = .244, and small effect size d = .11. The results support 
the conclusion to accept the null hypothesis and state there is no relationship between the 
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation and differences in local violent crime rates. 
Despite this assertion, when I compared the violent crime rate for each city to the analysis 
of the nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate, a difference presents itself. 
The national crime rate analyzed during the same time frame did decrease at a 
statistically significant level p = .001 with large effect size, d = 1.21. Results from the 
aggregate analysis showed a 3% decrease in the mean local violent crime rate and a 9% 
decrease in the mean national crime rate during the same time-frame. The data also 
unveil that beginning in 2012, violent crime rates are progressively worsening in the 
wake of these investigations. Despite the acceptance of the null hypothesis, the evidence 
supports the notion that violent crime rates are negatively impacted by the 
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commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, especially when considering the possibility 
of nonreported crime. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and 
arrest rates? 
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a local law enforcement agency. 
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD 
investigation into a law enforcement agency. 
Arrest rates were also analyzed city by city and in the aggregate. I found arrest 
rates decreasing in most cities after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. 
Despite large effect sizes on most results, only three cities showed a statistically 
significant decrease. No city showed a significant increase. When analyzed in the 
aggregate, arrest rate means decreased at a significant level, p = .001 with medium to 
large effect size, d = .72. Mean differences showed overall a 21% decrease from before 
and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation.  
Based on these results I reject the null hypothesis and find that arrest rates do 
differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. This finding 
establishes a relationship between the commencement of a DOJCRD investigations and 
arrest rates declining. This finding supports the notion of de-policing due to DOJCRD 
intervention. 
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Limitations of the Study 
The intended source for data was the Uniform Crime Rate (UCR). For this study, 
I wanted to use only Part 1 offenses as defined by the UCR. I decided to use only Part 1 
offenses primarily to keep the data as clean as possible. Each state and the federal 
government tend to have different interpretations of crime classification, particularly in 
Part Two offenses. For this reason, I only considered Part 1 violent crime offenses in the 
study. 
The law enforcement agencies in this study have come under the scrutiny of the 
DOJCRD. Because of this, I believed the reporting of violent crime and arrest data by 
each of the agencies would be accurate and complete. I found several agencies were not 
reporting to the UCR. Some cities provided only crime data and not arrest data. In a 
disturbingly high number of cases, the data are inaccurate, and I didn’t know if that was 
due to the agency reporting or the regurgitation by the UCR. Initially, my research design 
was to analyze month to month data for 36 months before and after the introduction of 
the independent variable, the commencement of the DOJCRD investigation. Due to 
inconsistent reporting, I had to alter the design to 3 years before and after the introduction 
of the independent variable. So rather than having n = 36, I had to settle for n = 3. I also 
found many mistakes where data were erroneous or just missing. These findings 
prompted me to seek data from the individual agencies. 
Using Freedom of Information Act request forms for several agencies, I was able 
to retrieve more data than I would have through the UCR. I found the process of 
gathering data from any source was very lengthy and cumbersome. Rather than to 
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decrease sample size, I chose to work through these problems with data collection and 
believe I have a comprehensive and complete list of all the data available. Despite this 
assertion, some agencies are not included because violent crime and arrest data are not 
available. Again, this is remarkable considering they have come under the scrutiny of the 
DOJCRD who like the UCR are under the umbrella of the Department of Justice. I 
believe that despite these setbacks with data collection, the results are trustworthy due to 
persistent efforts in data collection which ultimately increased validity and 
generalizability. 
Another limitation for consideration is this study analyzed violent crime and 
arrest rates. Besides the possibility of non-reported crime, there are many other potential 
confounding variables associated with violent crime and arrest rates. I attempt to address 
this through longitudinal research design. By analyzing 22 years of data (1995-2017) 
from the entire population of agencies within the parameters of the research, validity and 
reliability improve.  
Recommendations 
This study expands on the current research into the cause of substantial increases 
in crime and decreases in police productivity in certain cities in the United States. These 
changes are occurring while the national crime rate is substantially decreasing. To date, 
researchers have considered many possibilities and, in some instances, have questioned 
the efficacy of the DOJCRD. 
To determine if an investigation by the DOJCRD fit within the parameters of this 
study, I had to review DOJCRD findings from their investigation of local law 
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enforcement agencies. The review was necessary to determine if the DOJCRD’s 
investigation was an overarching pattern and practice investigation and to establish the 
date the investigation commenced. Future researchers may want to look at these 
investigations more thoroughly. Most of the findings contained in these reports were not 
based on facts presented but rather the perceptions gleaned from documents reviewed, 
officials interviewed, and responses from public advocacy groups. In one case, U.S. 
District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder dismissed a case involving Alamance County 
Sheriff’s Department because the DOJCRD did not present “reliable and persuasive 
proof” of patterns and practice of civil rights abuses. The County Attorney for Alamance, 
Clyde B. Albright was quoted saying, “Unfortunately, most law enforcement agencies are 
afraid to challenge the civil rights division, even when its claims are completely bogus” 
(Kelly, Childress & Rich, 2015). 
In 2014, Missoula County Attorney, Fred Van Valkenburg received a national 
award from the National District Attorney Association Board for his stand against the 
DOJCRD. Van Valkenburg’s office was the target of a DOJCRD investigation into 
alleged mishandling of sexual assault cases. Van Valkenburg accused the DOJCRD of 
“bully tactics” and stated, “One of the most important things about challenging the DOJ’s 
legal authority to investigate our office was to try and make sure other prosecutors were 
not subject to the kind of illegal and unfair attacks we were forced to endure.” Michael 
Moore, the president of the National District Attorney Association Board, was quoted, 
“Van Valkenburg’s reaction to the DOJCRD set a precedent for future relationships 
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between the federal government and locally elected officials” (Haake, 2014)(Kaste, 
2014).    
Support for DOJCRD findings appears more likely to be challenged in the future. 
From my viewpoint as a retired investigator, the evidence presented in the findings 
reports is very weak. Future researchers may be able to request field notes or other 
evidence such as statistical data from investigators that led to DOJCRD findings. Armed 
with that data, if available, researchers can then make an independent analysis and 
conclude with proper presentation of the findings. 
Future researchers may also want to consider potential biases within the DOJCRD 
itself and how this changes with each Administration. The DOJCRD lists no specific 
criteria for decisions to move forward with a formal investigation. They conduct a 
preliminary inquiry and decide if a full investigation is warranted. I could not find any 
specific triggering point to move forward with a formal investigation when I reviewed 
their findings. The data from this study also suggests a correlation with changes in 
Presidential administrations. If the finding holds true, this opens the door for the 
possibility of bias within the Department of Justice that may ebb and flow with the 
underlying ideologies of the current administration. As stated earlier, allegations of 
selective bias on the part of local law enforcement agencies are in findings reports of the 
DOJCRD investigations. This allegation may also hold true for the DOJCRD itself.    
Finally, future researchers may want to consider the overall monetary costs and 
outcome of these investigations when conducted by the DOJCRD. A comparison can be 
made with results from state and local investigative teams. The costs associated with 
80 
 
DOJCRD investigations are enormous. As stated in the literature review, The 
Washington Post (2015) found the Los Angeles Police Department, DOJCRD reform 
agreement cost taxpayers an estimated $300 million. The investigation alone took the 
DOJCRD four years to complete. At the same time, Mayor Tom Bradley convened an 
investigation by the Special Independent Commission better known as the Christopher 
Commission who found the same results within 4 months (Independent Commission on 
the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991). 
Conclusion 
To say I was disappointed with the data from the UCR is an understatement. 
Because the UCR is used both nationally and internationally in so many ways, the 
Department of Justice should put more emphasis into this program. There is a far greater 
purpose for UCR statistics than there is for the DOJCRD. 
 The results of this study unveiled the negative consequences of DOJCRD 
investigations adding to the questions of the efficacy of this organization. When 
combined with the cost associated with this enormous bureaucracy, perhaps it’s time for 
Congress to re-examine 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The data indicates these investigations are 
only getting worse for communities and law enforcement agencies. 
The need for police to work within the confines of the U.S. Constitution cannot be 
overstated. Rushin and Edwards (2017) argue that increased crime is the cost of 
Constitutional policing and that more money should be allocated to the DOJCRD for 
their work. I don’t agree. There are many avenues available to citizens if their 
Constitutional rights are violated by anyone, including law enforcement. If indeed a law 
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enforcement agency is exhibiting patterns and practices of Constitutional and civil rights 
violations on its citizens, state agencies have the power to target and investigate local law 
enforcement agencies. In the past, this was done at comparatively minuscule costs and in 
considerably less time.  
Congress turned down the Department of Justice request four times before they 
finally granted this power to the DOJCRD through the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act. As stated earlier, not always do politicians get it right. The DOJCRD is 
a massive federal bureaucracy that is negatively impacting law enforcement agencies and 
the communities they serve. Congress should repeal this decision. 
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Appendix A: Crime and Arrest Rates with Trendlines 
Trendlines are 3 years before and 3 years after the commencement of a 
department of justice investigation (arrest data were not available in some cities). 
  
  
  
  
  
  
3 2 1 1 2 3
Pittsburgh, PA 1996
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
New Orleans, LA 1996
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Los Angeles, CA 1996
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Montgomery, MD 1996
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Columbus, OH 1998
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Washington, DC 1999
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
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3 2 1 1 2 3
Charleston, WV 1999
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Mount Prospect, IL 2000
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Highland Park, IL 2000
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Prince George County, MD 2000
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Cincinnati, OH 2001
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Detroit, MI 2001
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Schenectaby, NY 2001
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Prince Georges County, MD 1999
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
93 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
3 2 1 1 2 3
Portland, ME 2002
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Miami, FL 2002
Arrest Rate Crime  Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime  Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Bakersfield, CA 2003
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Expon. (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Beacon, NY 2004
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Warren, OH 2004
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Easton, PA 2005
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Austin, TX 2007
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Yonkers, NY 2007
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
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3 2 1 1 2 3
Lorain, OH 2008
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Harvey, IL 2008
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Inglewood, CA 2009
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Suffolk County, NY 2009
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
East Haven, CT 2009
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
New Orleans, LA 2010
Crime Rate Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Seattle, WA 2011
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Newark, NJ 2011
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
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(Baltimore and Chicago are limited to two years because 2017 data is currently 
unavailable.) 
 
 
 
3 2 1 1 2 3
Portland, OR 2011
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Miami, FL 2011
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Albuquerque, NM 2012
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Cleveland, OH 2013
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
3 2 1 1 2 3
Ferguson, MO 2014
Arrest Rate Crime Rae
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rae)
2 1 1 2
Baltimore, MD 2015
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
2 1 1 2
Chicago, IL 2015
Arrest Rate Crime Rate
Linear (Arrest Rate) Linear (Crime Rate)
